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THE PROBLEM OF PEASANT-EUROPE

BY PETER F. DRUCKER

TO find a workable solution for the Balkans and Poland is perhaps the most difficult task which European statesmanship will have had to perform since the Congress of Vienna after the Napoleonic wars. But such a solution would be the key to the settlement of the major problems of the Continent. Seen from a continental-European point of view, the World War was primarily a Balkan war fought for the succession to the disintegrating Austro-Hungarian and Turkish empires. Austria-Hungary, Italy, Turkey and Russia—four of the six principal belligerents on the Continent—entered the war to defend or to enlarge their holdings and interests in South-Eastern Europe. The defection of the Slavonic nations from Austria was one of the principal reasons for the collapse of the Central powers. The Versailles peace was also primarily a Balkan peace. Its symbol was Wilson's Fourteen Points which proclaimed the right to independence of the small nations of the South-East, and the one important territorial consequence of the World War in Europe was the establishment of the independent States of Poland, Czechoslovakia and Yugoslavia and the elevation of Rumania to the rank of an independent great power in the East.

The present war is even more of a Balkan war than was the World War. The main aim of Germany and one of the principal aims of Russia is to obtain control of the South-East. The Allies went to war in order to prevent the destruction of the small peasant countries. Strategically control of the Dardanelles —the key to the Balkans—and of the Lower Danube may well decide the outcome of the war. Not only was Hitler's attack eastward the immediate cause of the war but in eastern peasant Europe lie the remote causes of the present conflict. Hitler became a European menace largely because the weakness

of the small Versailles-created countries in the East made them fall easy prey to German aggression. Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland were not so much " conquered " in the usual military sense of the word, as they collapsed internally and externally. Austria had twice, Czechoslovakia four times, Poland twelve times the population of Finland ; and each of them was infinitely wealthier. If either of these countries had had as much internal cohesion and stability as Finland the Nazi government would hardly have dared to attack them. Although this internal weakness of the small peasant countries is no excuse for Nazi militarism, it must be realized that as long as this weakness continues the attempts of the neighbouring Great Powers—either Germany, Italy or Russia—to conquer the South-East will also continue and will make peace in Europe impossible, irrespective of the legal forms of European organization.

The importance of the eastern peasant countries for the future of Europe greatly exceeds, however, these territorial and political considerations. They are Europe's frontier. They contain the only fast-growing population in Europe outside of Russia. In 1810 their population was less than a sixth of Europe's total. To-day it is a fourth. During the last twenty years their population has increased by almost 25 per cent. while that of the European countries to the West has remained almost stationary. As a group the 100 million peasants in Eastern Europe already outnumber both the Anglo-Saxon—Scandinavian group and the Germans ; and in another twenty years they should also outnumber the Latin people and should have become the largest single group in Europe outside Russia.

In addition, continental European history during the last sixty years has been dominated by the problem of integrating this frontier into the European order. Up to the middle of the 19th century the eastern peasant nations were politically, economically and socially shut off from Europe. Austria-Hungary and Turkey kept them outside the main currents of European development in a state of semi-oriental, semi-tribal isolation. They furnished soldiers for the Austrian, Russian and Turkish armies, unskilled labour for the young industries of western Germany and Bohemia, grain for Vienna and

Liverpool. But any native who wanted to escape his tribal isolation had first to give up his national identity ; in order to learn to read and write he had not only to learn German, Hungarian or Turkish but to become a German, Hungarian or Turk. The obsolete structures of Austria and Turkey collapsed under the impact of the twin forces of 19th century nationalism and 19th century capitalism. Since then—beginning with the Hungarian revolt of 1848 and the War of the Crimea six years later—the Balkans have been the " powder keg " of Europe. The peasant people have been drawn increasingly into the European orbit. And the more they strove to assimilate themselves to Europe, the more Europe has been forced to attempt to integrate them—by war, economic expansion or cultural penetration. From this viewpoint the Little Entente—not the League of Nations—was the main feature of the Versailles organization of Europe and the principal result of the World War. The Little Entente was the main instrument to maintain the 1918 settlement and was conceived by France for that purpose. It proclaimed the principles of national democracy and capitalist economy, which had proved so successful in the West and victorious in the war, and which were now to furnish the basis for the East. The Little Entente was the symbol of the first systematic attempt to make the peasant countries an integral part of Europe by organizing them on European principles.

In the failure of this attempt lies the final explanation for the failure of Versailles to establish a lasting peace. The post-War order did not take root in the peasant countries ; the new states in Eastern Europe did not succeed in integrating themselves into nations. Their democratic governments degenerated within six or eight years into dictatorships of a small clique ; their economy collapsed at the outset of the Depression ; and their weakness made possible Germany's attempt to establish hegemony in Europe dooming the high hopes of lasting peace entertained in the twenties.

The peasant of Eastern Europe is a most sincere democrat. Centuries of oppression and of foreign rule have imbued him with a strong desire for liberty, freedom and civil rights. His one defence against the Austrian and Turkish rulers lay in the

cohesion of his family and tribal councils; and he has thus a long tradition of local self-government and co-operation. He is passionately eager to become a living part of Europe; nowhere were the Fourteen Points received with greater hopes and greater enthusiasm than in the small peasant communities on the Danube and on the Vistula. And nowhere was the belief in lasting peace, the hatred of war, deeper and more sincere than amongst the peasants who had been cannon fodder and victims of other peoples' wars for centuries.

Socially, Eastern Europe seems to offer ideal conditions for democracy. Even before 1918 the economic differences were small—smaller than in any part of Europe except Scandinavia; after the war the social structure was levelled even more by the expropriation of the big landowners everywhere but in Hungary and Eastern Poland. The overwhelming majority of the people are small owner-farmers to whom aristocracy and social privileges are hardly known. It is simply not true that the peasant people were not "ripe" for democracy. And it is also not true that they failed for want of trying, because they tried desperately hard and sincerely. Yet democracy collapsed within a few years politically, socially and economically.

It has been fashionable these last fifteen years to blame the territorial settlement of the peace treaties for this breakdown. But there is little substance for this charge. Whatever mistakes were made in western Europe, the frontiers drawn by the peace makers in Eastern Europe were on the whole remarkably fair. Anyone who should try to-day to re-draw the frontiers in peasant Europe on the basis of the principle of national self-determination would arrive at approximately the same territorial settlement; the only changes of importance would be in the correction of the Hungarian-Rumanian and of the former Hungarian-Czech border lines in Hungary's favour. Otherwise the Versailles frontiers in Eastern Europe contained no provable major violation of the principle of national self-determination. Even the obvious hybrid of the Polish Corridor did not, as German propaganda charged, owe its existence to disregard of national boundary lines, but, on the contrary, to a perhaps exaggerated observance of them which made the peace-makers refuse the incorporation of German speaking East Prussia into

Poland, thus subordinating the political, economic and strategic strength of the new Poland to national considerations.

Of far greater importance than the problems of minorities and territorial injustices for the development of post-War peasant Europe was its over-population. The peasant-East is the most densely populated agricultural part of Europe. Consequently, individual farms, divided and sub-divided through generations, have become too small not only for efficient production but in many cases for the maintenance of a subsistence farmer, especially as the soil over large parts is poor. Population pressure, intensified by the high birth rate of the last twenty years certainly played a part in the disintegration of these countries. And it is at least conceivable that the eastern countries would have succeeded had there been large-scale opportunities for emigration for their peasant surplus population. Nevertheless, population pressure can only have been a contributary cause. Up till 1927 the peasants were on the whole more prosperous than before the War, in spite of the population problem : yet democracy had broken down in every eastern country before then.

The real cause of the collapse of the post-War order in the peasant countries cannot be found in technical deficiencies of the peace settlements, nor in bad government, poverty or ignorance. It lies in the very principles of the post-War organization of peasant Europe. Although enthusiastically adopted by the peoples themselves, the principles of national democracy and industrial capitalism proclaimed by the Fourteen Points were at variance with all the realities of the peasant-East and could not take root in the peasant soil. The best proof of this is the development of Czechoslovakia. The Czechs who traditionally, culturally and socially belong to the West adopted the principles of the Fourteen Points with the greatest success and built a strong happy nation upon this basis. But in Slovakia, the eastern part of the country, which belongs by tradition, culture and social structure to the peasant-East, the same government and the same principles failed completely ; the Slovak peasants, though nationally one with the Czechs, deserted the Czechoslovak national state in the first crisis, thus rendering it incapable of self-defence. They repudiated national democracy

and industrial capitalism just as vehemently as the Czechs had accepted them.

To be workable, national democracy needs first a nation. But there is only one nation in the Western-European sense in the peasant countries : the Hungarians. Hungary incidentally was the only Eastern European country that did not adopt the principles of the Fourteen Points but continued as a semi-feudal oligarchy of the " great families " and their " connections ". Consequently social tension between the ruling class with its large estates and the land-starved peasants is nowhere greater than in Hungary ; and when the Nazis two years ago started to preach social revolution in the Balkans they found nowhere more willing listeners than in Hungary where semi-official estimates at the end of 1938 gave 60 per cent. of the people as favourable to the Nazi programme. Yet, to-day Hungary is strongest internally of all Eastern European countries. For when with the German occupation of Bohemia last March the Nazi programme revealed itself as one of imperialist expansion and conquest, and as a threat to Hungarian national independence, the national unity of the Hungarian people asserted itself above all social dissensions. Elsewhere in the peasant-East, however, the nation is not a political reality. National consciousness is a newcomer in the peasant countries where it was unknown till the middle of the last century. In these countries most of which had no written language and no literate culture until after 1848, national loyalties are not regarded as supreme ; they have to compete with the much older and firmly entrenched loyalties to religion and social class. Most of the peasant nations have been divided for centuries amongst different empires with different cultures and traditions ; and in character and tradition the different parts of each peasant nation have developed differently according to their history. The gulf between Czechs and Slovaks—both speaking the same language and professing the same religion—is due entirely to the fact that the Czechs under Austrian rule became a " Western ", the Slovaks under Hungarian rule an " Eastern " people. The same historical accident divides Slovenes and Croats ; but both, as Catholics and former Austro-Hungarian subjects regard as foreigners the Serbs, orthodox and former subjects of the

Sultan, and the Bosnians who turned Moslem and became full Turkish citizens. Yet all four speak the same language. And even among the small Croat people there is a noticeable difference between the Croats of the plains who used to look towards Budapest and Vienna, and the Croats of the Dalmatian coast who under the influence and overlordship of Venice, became almost latinized in culture, and who definitely belong to the Mediterranean civilization. In Rumania there is a tremendous gulf between the people of the "Old Kingdom" where the leaders are French or Russian trained and where popular tradition is that of the Turkish rule, and the Rumanians in the former Hungarian province who obtained their culture, civilization and laws largely from Budapest and Vienna. Even in Poland which was under foreign yoke for only 125 years and which maintained during this time a fierce patriotism, the provinces governed respectively by Russia, Austria and Prussia developed in directions so different that the post-War Poland after twenty years of hard work had not yet assimilated the three parts to each other.

In other words, the pattern of life in peasant Europe is primarily a tribal pattern in which national consciousness is only one of many conflicting and competing factors of cohesion and division. According to the standards of national distinction prevailing in Western Europe such as language or common extraction, three quarters of the peasant-eastern population should belong to one Western Slavonic nation; the differences in language between Poles on the Baltic shore and Croats on the Adriatic are considerably smaller than those between Highland Scots and Cornishmen, or between a man from Berlin and a Bavarian. Only the 10 million Hungarians and the 18 million Rumanians stand out as separate linguistic or racial entities. But actually the peasant countries are peopled by a very large number of small units whose individuality is not primarily that of nationality. This explains the minority problem of these countries. The peasant-East is not any more mixed in its racial or national origin than England or Germany. But in those countries where there was a nation, small groups of foreign origin were rapidly absorbed and integrated into the surrounding national unity. In the peasant countries there

was no such national unity into which a small group could dissolve itself. And so each group was forced to preserve itself intact and to assert itself against the other groups. The French Protestants driven out by Louis XIV. were settled in western and northern Germany at about the same time that the so-called Swabians—German peasants mostly from the Rhine—were settled on the Hungarian border in what is now Rumania. The French Protestants became German within a generation or two; even their names were mostly Germanized within a hundred years. But the Swabians have retained up to this day their German language, their customs, their architecture and never even intermarried with the surrounding Hungarians and Rumanians. Nationality in peasant-Europe exhausts itself therefore primarily in the negative; it is a factor which sets one man apart from the other. But it has very little affirmative force; it does not bind people together in a common national consciousness. Against a foreign oppression Serbs and Croats, Czechs and Slovaks, " old " Rumanians and " new " Rumanians will make common cause although perhaps not before the foreign rule has been established. But otherwise the non-national factors that separate them will appear to them of equal, if not of greater importance than their common nationality.

In this region of multiplicity the Versailles settlement set up States based on the belief in the supremacy of the national above all other ties, and on the assertion of national uniformity. The result was inevitably a widening of the traditional and tribal demarcation lines within the state as each small unit, not without reason, felt itself threatened in its individual existence. To aggravate the situation, the new States took over together with the doctrine of national unity the theory of centralized government; not only because centralization had been the general European trend for a hundred years, but also because the model after which the new countries tried to shape themselves was France—the most centralized country in Europe. But for the small peasant groups centralization had been the main enemy for centuries. They had opposed the Austrian, Hungarian, Russian or Turkish rulers as much because they were foreigners as because they governed from far-off Vienna, Budapest, Petersburg or Constantinople without knowledge of and regard

for local desires and traditions. All the local co-operatives, religious fraternities, gymnastic associations and patriotic societies which had carried the fight against the foreign oppression had had as their main objective the re-establishment of local self-government in political, economic, religious and social affairs. But the new States were fully as centralized as the old foreign *régimes* had been ; actually, in many cases as for instance in Croatia, Slovenia, Southern Poland and Western Rumania, the new states imposed a considerably greater centralization than the former rulers had done, and destroyed whatever local self-government there had been.

It was, however, not only in the political sphere that the new principle of national democracy proved unworkable. It also could not grow roots socially. For national democracy pre-supposes a middle-class and a middle-class mentality. It grew in Western Europe out of and with the middle classes and it expresses their political convictions. In peasant Europe, however, there was no such middle class ; nor was there any social or economic function for it. And the new national states in the peasant countries were therefore left hanging in the air—without the social substance that would have been necessary to enable them to fulfil the task of making a united nation out of the multitude of tribal groups.

The other basic principle of the Versailles settlement—that of industrial capitalism—did not fit any better into the peasant realities. The peasant of Eastern Europe is certainly not anti-capitalist in the sense that he is a socialist ; he believes firmly in the private ownership of land. But he is anti-capitalist in opposing concentration of wealth and the tendency to make money the yardstick for the whole economic life. Above all, he opposes the creation of a landless mass of factory workers. To the peasant who measures his wealth in tangibles : land and currency, and his income in terms of foodstuffs, the landless proletariat appears as a monstrous inhuman threat. Representative of these beliefs is the programme of the Croat Peasant Party—the intellectual leader and the most articulate and best-organized of the Eastern peasant parties. This programme demands public ownership of all public utilities, under control and supervision of local boards ; development of industry on

co-operative lines with ownership or control of the local plants vested in the local peasants ; and a settlement of all industrial workers on the land as subsistence-farmers and part-time workers. The peasants, of course, gladly accept factory work in lean times; and most of the peasants of Eastern Europe make excellent skilled workers. But they oppose the system and deny the very beliefs on which industrial capitalism is based. The industrialization of the peasant countries and the invasion of finance capitalism after 1918 appeared to the peasants, therefore, as a brutal assault upon their liberties and as an exploitation fully as bad as anything done by their former foreign rulers.

The result of this clash between the new principles and the political and social realities of peasant Europe is the deep gulf which separates not only the people and their rulers, but also the people and their state. It is a moot question whether the peasants in 1938 were worse off or better off than in 1913. But it is certain that the peasants resent what they regard as treachery of their own rulers more than the ill-treatment meted out by their former oppressors of whom, after all, nothing better was expected.

As for the rulers, they are or, as in the case of Poland, were, a small group out of contact with the people, the one exception being Hungary. In most countries dictatorship prevails openly. The dictators with their retinue of court officials, officers, bureaucrats, bankers and industrialists are as much foreigners in their own country as the Lombard bankers were in medieval England. They have therefore to fall back upon one or two of the many tribal groups with the result that there is real discrimination against the members of other groups. Before the recent settlement in Yugoslavia all the 130 generals of the army were Serbs ; there was not a single Croat, Slovene, Bosnian, German or Hungarian amongst them, although the Serbs are less than 50 per cent. of the population. In Poland, where the Ruthenians accounted for at least 20 per cent. of the population, they had no representation at all in the senior branches of the civil service, in the higher courts, the army or the large private and public banks.

The rulers of the peasant countries tried fervently to develop middle-classes in order to create social support for the national

state. The growth of the cities in the peasant countries during the last twenty years has been phenomenal. That the new middle classes fulfil their national function was shown convincingly in the German attack on Poland, where Warsaw alone offered resistance to the German Army ; had the peasants adhered as valiantly to the national cause, the conquest of Poland would have at least been delayed a long time. But these middle classes, however necessary politically, have no economic and social roots. They have to be artificially fed—either through enlargement of the bureaucratic machine or through enforced industrialization which creates white-collar employment in private business. The one has bred sloth and corruption, the other the economic nationalism which made the tariff barriers, industrial prices and industrial costs in the peasant countries the highest in Europe. Which of these two consequences was more harmful it is impossible to say ; but together they certainly offset whatever advantage accrued to national unity from the growth of the middle class.

One can hardly blame the rulers in these countries for these developments. They had little other choice, for the peasants had no alternative to offer. With the overwhelming majority of the population peasants, no government could maintain itself in these countries against their organized opposition regardless of police terror, election manœuvres and ballot-stuffing. And in every one of the peasant countries except Hungary the peasant parties actually ruled for considerable periods. But they had no workable programmes and fluctuated between a hopeless romanticism and a sterile negation of the fundamentals of the state which they had to rule. They could not find a synthesis between their own beliefs and the principles of the new States ; to be true to one was to betray the other. In spite of their numerical superiority and of the enthusiastic support of their followers the power simply slipped out of their hands. Although peasant unrest and revolts have been endemic in the peasant-East—here a rising against new taxes, there an attempt to burn down a new factory or to drive out a hated official—the peasant governments were overthrown without any resistance ; a royal decree was sufficient in Yugoslavia and Rumania, the revolt of a handful of officers in Bulgaria and Poland. Since their fall the

peasant masses have had no share in the government and no influence in the shaping of their own destinies. They are a sullen, bewildered and embittered opposition in their own countries which are run on principles which from the peasant point of view seem to deny the rights and even the existence of the human being known as peasant.

It is perhaps an exaggeration to say that the war will be won by the side which first offers a workable solution to peasant-Europe. But it is certainly true that that side will win the peace. Fortunately for England and France both, Germany and Russia missed their chance to develop such a programme. As late as last Spring Germany could have rallied the peasant opposition under the flag of social revolution ; and it seemed as if the Nazi leaders were consciously working in this direction. The conquest of Bohemia and Moravia and the subsequent invasion and rape of Poland destroyed, however, whatever chances Germany had had to win the allegiance of the Eastern European peasants. Totalitarian fascism may still spread to the Danubian countries and may still be embraced by the peasants. But it would be directed against Germany herself and would be based upon the old hatred of the German conqueror.

Russia had even greater chances of producing a solution for peasant-Europe and of extending her ideological and political influence over the South East. Pro-Russian sentiment was very strong among the pan-slav peasants of Bulgaria and Serbia. Russia is a peasant country herself, and the Soviet Revolution claimed to set up a peasant *régime*. Finally, Russia could have opened up Siberia for immigration and settlement, thus attracting the peasant surplus population. But Russia abolished private peasant property and persecuted religion, thus fighting the two main pillars of peasant society. She put all the emphasis upon industrialization and became even more centralized than the old Russia of the Tsars. She closed her borders rigidly ; but even if she had invited immigration into Siberia the Eastern European peasants would not have come without reliable guarantees of private property, civil liberties, religious and cultural freedom and local self-government none of which the Soviet *régime* was prepared to grant. Before the Russian invasions of Poland and Finland the great majority of the

peasants of Eastern Europe had therefore already come to regard Russia not only as hostile and reactionary, but also as Asiatic and as the greatest threat to their own desire to become a living part of Europe.

Yet, although neither Nazi Germany nor Soviet Russia can organize the eastern-peasant countries on a permanent basis, the Allies cannot hope to win the peasant-countries by default. Nor is there any hope that a second attempt to organize peasant-Europe on the lines of western national democracy and industrial capitalism will be any more successful than the first. The absence of any constructive programme for the peasant countries constitutes therefore the weakest link in the Allied armour.

An economic union of the peasant countries such as is widely discussed just now, could not solve the problems of peasant-Europe. The peasant countries are not complementary economically; they all produce the same goods for the same export markets in which they fiercely compete. There is little trade between them to-day. And there would not be a great increase in their mutual trade if they abolished the trade barriers between each other. After all, in the Austro-Hungarian monarchy all the trade of the peasant provinces was with the industrial provinces in the west, not with their peasant neighbours, as any Danubian railroad map shows conclusively. A European economic and customs union, however desirable, would also not in itself be effective in the solution of the peasant problem. This applies even under the improbable assumption that the industrial countries in central and western Europe completely abandon their agricultural subsidies and tariffs, and that the products of the peasant countries receive preferential treatment in western and central Europe at the expense not only of the domestic farmer but also of the low-cost overseas producers in the United States, the British Dominions and South America. While such a scheme would open up new markets for the peasant countries it would put their prices and purchasing power completely into the hands of the economically strong western powers. And the ratio between the agricultural prices which the peasants receive, and the prices for industrial commodities which they have to pay would unfailingly move against the peasants. In other words the development would

parallel that of the free-trade area of the old Austria-Hungary where the resultant economic discontent of the peasants proved to be fully as much a disintegrating force as the national opposition against the foreign rule. Or, to use a contemporary example, a European free-trade union would throw the peasant countries as much at the mercy of the West as their present trade agreements with Germany throw them at the mercy of German industry. As long as the peasant countries are economically weak, free trade must lead to their exploitation. For the cause of their weakness does not lie in trade but in the absence of capital; and such a weakness must, according to all rules of economic science, depress the prices for the products of the poorer producer.

Any programme for peasant-Europe must therefore first provide for cheap and plentiful capital for the peasants, to be used for the improvement of production methods, the development of producers' and marketing co-operatives, and the construction of co-operatively-owned small local industries. It will be said, and with reason, that loans made on such a basis will hardly be repaid in full, and will, at least in part, turn into subsidies. But the loans made by the United States, Great Britain and France to the peasant countries during the twenties proved just as much subsidies. Moreover, the loans of the twenties were not only lost economically more completely than loans to the peasants would be, but they were also a complete loss socially and politically. They went to the rulers and were used up in a futile attempt to build up large-scale, centralized industries which can never hope to compete with the West, and a middle-class which has no roots in the country. These uses are not only regarded as harmful by the peasant masses but their results can only be maintained through further and increased subsidies either from abroad or out of the purchasing power and income of the peasants. Loans to the peasants, on the other hand, would at least be productive socially and politically. That a peasant society on a co-operative basis can be strong, prosperous and well-integrated if it only has sufficient capital, has been demonstrated by the Slovenes in western Yugoslavia who justly call themselves the "Scandinavians of Southern Europe".

Secondly there must be systematic and organized emigration and re-settlement of the surplus population of peasant-Europe. Such a plan would, incidentally, also solve the pressing Jewish question in eastern Hungary, Rumania and Poland where the Jews have, on the one hand, largely lost the social and economic functions they fulfilled before, while, on the other hand, the pressure of population makes the people envy them the few positions they still have.

Finally the political organization of peasant-Europe would have to base itself upon decentralization. A nation can be united in peasant-Europe only if local self-government is strong. After all, it was no less a statesman than Thomas Masaryk, the founder of Czechoslovakia and the greatest political genius the Slavonic race has yet produced, who proclaimed Switzerland with the strong and proud self-government of its small " Kantons " to be the political model for the organization of the peasant countries.

All such measures would, however, only be a first approach to the great, basic problem ; how can the agrarian civilization and society of the peasants be integrated into a Europe that is predominantly industrial ? Ultimately the peasants themselves who want to maintain their society and to belong to Europe at the same time, will probably have to find the answer. The present war may help them. It has already made them aware of their danger, and has persuaded them to approach each other with more tolerance as shown in the recent Serbo-Croat federal settlement. But even under the certainly optimistic assumption that the peasant countries can develop their own form of life and of political and social structure, if only left alone, the problem of peasant-Europe will remain a general European one. Its solution will not only profoundly affect the European political and economic structure but will also require considerable sacrifices, concessions and adjustments on the part of central and western Europe. In Versailles it was possible—and perhaps inevitable—to overlook the existence of the problem of peasant-Europe. But the intervening twenty years have proved the truth of the old Austrian proverb : " Either the Balkans become a part of Europe, or all Europe will become a part of the Balkans ".

FRENCH AIMS

By Denis Saurat

I MUST first state that these views are in no way inspired by the French Government; I do not know any more about the views of the French Government than does anybody else who listens to broadcasts and reads the newspapers. Yet I do not think that these views are only my views: to the best of my feeling and knowledge, they are the views of the ordinary Frenchman. In fact I am trying all the time to keep down my own personal ideas as much as I can, and to speak on behalf of the French people that I know. Such, I think are their feelings; some of the ideas are my own, but only as a means of implementing those feelings; I do not deny better means may be found. In fact, I hope so.

We must distinguish between the immediate problems of the war which will have to be solved on the armistice and the long range problems of the organization of a permanent peace. It seems to me that Great Britain and France should solve the first problems alone, and that the larger issues should be left to a general congress, which should meet only after a long interval of, say, three to five years.

First, Britain and France must disarm Germany. Of course all this argument presupposes a complete victory over Germany first, the sort of victory we had in November 1918.

The French are afraid that at this point the English are going again to become sentimental and to maintain that the best way to disarm Germany is to be kind and generous. The French cannot see any reason at all in this attitude. They remember too well that for over a century, after Fichte and Bismarck, and without any change of policy practically at all the Germans have, by set policy, deceived their neighbours, friends or allies as well as enemies or neutrals. Lying and pretending to be good-natured is a natural German attitude. The French will not trust the Germans again, whatever the English may say.

There was a change between 1919 and 1923? Perhaps, with a few Germans; remember that *those* Germans were murdered, like Rathenau. Remember that when the French went into the Ruhr, they found the machinery for making big guns in full working order. Photographs can be seen in the *Illustrated London News* for 1923. The Germans were supposed to be deprived of big guns. We were told that they had disarmed.

Concessions as a policy? The French remember that when they abandoned the occupation of the Rhineland five years before the date stipulated by treaty, as a gesture of appeasement, the first thing that happened was that Hindenburg came over the Rhine and delivered a speech of violent hatred against the French, and was applauded all over Germany. Concessions did not bring appeasement neither then nor at any time—and this was before Hitler.

These pleas of generosity, concessions, fair play, will not be accepted by the French, and will be considered to be pleas of hypocrites who dare not quite say that they are pro-Germans. I know this will be unjust to many sincere religious or pacifist people; but you will have a hard task to persuade the French, who also know very well that there is such a thing as unconscious hypocrisy, based on cowardice.

It will be no good to ask the Germans to sit at a table and discuss terms. The Germans will simply say no to everything they are asked to concede. At this stage therefore Great Britain and France must impose their will on Germany. Remember that the beginning of the Nazi success was in the lie that Germany had not been beaten in the field, but betrayed into surrendering. To avoid a renewal of this, and to ensure disarmament physically and really, not morally and platonically, British and French regiments must be quartered for several months at least and perhaps years in the chief towns of Germany: the people of Leipzig, of Hanover, of Potsdam, of Munich, of Koenigsberg must see that they have been beaten; and our military chiefs must see that the Germans have disarmed.

Now to this there is a counterpart that we have to face: during that period Germany must be fed and given a reasonable standard of prosperity. The task before us is at bottom a task of education. We must teach the German people that war and

aggression do not pay; but one cannot teach starving people anything but anger. We shall have to take the responsibility of feeding and keeping the German people during that occupation. Treat them severely on the moral plane, but sufficiently well on the material plane. They will understand.

This is possible, because at present there is no resentment against the German people among the French masses. In no class have I noticed so far any desire for revenge, any vindictive feelings. We shall not want to punish the Germans; but we shall want them to change their minds.

Nevertheless this idea of "no resentment" must not be driven too far. The English who advocate it so much are in danger of losing some of their vital instincts, without which a race is lost. For instance, they are losing the idea of justice, without which there can be no true brotherhood. So far the French have no resentment against the Germans. But do not forget that a large number of Poles and Czechs are in France. Is it realized in this country that millions of Poles and Czechs are being tortured in every way by the Germans? The Poles and Czechs in France know all about it; they are telling the French peasants and the French workmen amongst whom they live, all about it. The French as a rule, in their lower classes, are quick to sympathize, generous and easily fired. They cannot listen for ever to such tales as come from Poland and Bohemia and feel no resentment. If you preach the non-resentment theory too long to them, they will retort: it is easy for you not to feel resentment, because you have felt no suffering. And they will ask you: why are your sympathies with the torturers and not with the tortured? They will not understand that, on a given day, called the day of peace, suddenly those very torturers will immediately become angels of love, whereas on the day before they were raping and shooting. They will think that if nothing is done about it, the torturers will wait for their next chance and begin again.

Therefore when I say that at present there is no resentment among the French masses, I mean *at present*. I do not say that it will still be so when peace time comes. I hold also that there will be resentment among the masses in the British Empire as soon as they understand what is happening. The legitimate

instincts of human nature cannot be held in check by sentimental preachers living in safety and comfort. After all, we are told that Christ did drive merchants from the temple with a whip. How shall He drive the Germans from Poland ?

Too many people mix up two very different things. They are not really concerned with Christian charity, but with their fear of what may happen later on if the Germans are treated with strict justice. Is cowardice the same thing as charity ?

True charity to the German people as well as to the human race will demand that the German people shall be taught a lesson. This lesson, I think, will be effective if it takes the form of a severe but benevolent military occupation lasting long enough to convince the German masses that they have been misled by their leaders. A short occupation will not be enough : the Germans are slow to think ; and also, the ultimate evacuation will have to be carried out in such a way that no German leader should get the credit for it.

This object once achieved, the larger problems can be faced in an atmosphere of sober thought. The occupation itself will teach the Allies many things about Germany. The French and the British will be more competent to deal with Europe after occupying Germany and learning how things really stand there : for from the German leaders you will get only lies.

Then a peace congress should be called, say three years or so after the cessation of fighting. America should be invited to attend ; and some neutrals ; not all. Nor should they be given such a very important part : they shall have had no experience ; they shall not be competent to judge. But they must be prepared to collaborate. The Germans here should be admitted on a perfect footing of equality. Our bargaining counter with them will be the evacuation : we can speak openly and say : will you do this, and we do that ? We obviously cannot give them liberty to begin again. It is our concern whether or not they put a Nazi government into power—by any other name.

This peace congress will have a hard task. First of all, in order not to relapse into anarchy, the problems common to the nations of Western Europe must be solved in common. Constitute a union of Great Britain, France, Germany, Poland and Czechoslovakia. Instal a super cabinet in which all those

nations are represented : at this stage, we must have no more discrimination of any kind against the Germans as a people. (But this does not imply that you have to believe every lie that a German may choose to tell.) Vest in this super Cabinet, which will be really an extension of the present supreme council, all powers of importance to Western Europe as a whole :

(*a*) armaments of all kinds ; none of these nations is to have as national property any of the specialized weapons : aeroplanes, tanks, big guns, etc. ; civil aviation as well as military aviation should be internationalized—then, after a time military aviation might be suppressed to a very large extent.

(*b*) trade in all materials that can be used for war purposes should be exclusively in the hands of this super cabinet ; this involves a huge reorganization of industry ; but there is no alternative. We rearmed Germany : without the materials, from iron ore to chemicals of all sorts that we sold her, she could not have made war at all. This trade must be declared a criminal trade and suppressed. The super cabinet alone will deal in such things, for the Union as a whole. Need I put petrol on the list ?

Naturally, the strictest inspection shall have to be established and all the measures taken be given the widest publicity. It should not ever be permitted again that any body should make money out of the possibility of war.

I fully realize that these measures, which are negative, demand positive reconstruction : industry, deprived of its freedom in some of its biggest provinces, like metallurgy, must be reorganized : I do not say on a socialist or any other basis ; it can be done in many different ways. I plead here for no specific ideology ; I merely try to state the problems to be solved. Trade also will have to be given a charter ; and finance. Social reform shall have to be carried out. Just as you cannot disarm Germany if you starve her, you cannot reorganize Western Europe unless you suppress in the whole region under the Union, starvation, excessive discomfort and unemployment. It can be done, even under a capitalist system ; it can be done under any system if the will to do it is there. But it must be done ; otherwise, some other monster will arise, in the

East, in the Far East, somewhere, and take advantage of your internal weaknesses in the social order, and will begin again. Nor do I think that this super cabinet should have all powers. That would be to establish over us that very monster of tyranny that we are fighting. Clearly specified powers, of some such range as I have indicated, should be given the super cabinet. But in as many matters as possible powers should be, on the contrary, decentralized. Units like Scotland, or Brittany, or Provence, or Austria perhaps as members of some larger unit, Great Britain or France or Germany, should be given much more liberty for some of their regional activities than they have at present. This is, however, rather a different problem ; I only wish to insist on the fact that this super-government should be only a guarantor of the peace and freedom of smaller units even than national units, and of individuals, to live as they like—so long as they do not endanger the peace or liberty of others. Centralization of some powers is a necessary condition to the decentralization of other powers. A proper police at the top ensures liberty among the masses.

This brings me to the largest and deepest problem of all : education. Here also you must internationalize some things and give more liberty in some other things.

The first consideration is that the German boys and girls of the future must be taught the same kind of history and of ethics as the French, English, Polish children of the future. That the German girls shall also be taught German music can be taken for granted. Let each nation, let each province in each nation, let each individual anywhere cultivate their own gifts ; but let the same history and the same ethics be taught from Poland to Scotland, and in Germany also ; otherwise you will have wars for ever and ever, arising from the deepest and sincerest differences.

This problem also can be solved. Give the experts their task to do and they will do it ; take no excuse. Education can be managed, finance can be managed, metallurgy can be managed so as to eliminate international danger.

Of all these dangers, the worst, the deepest rooted, the most difficult to deal with, is in education. I wish we could make all

peoples Christian in truth ; but that will take too long no doubt. We are in a hurry ; see to it after this peace

> That neither kings nor priests
> Nor schools shall build again
> A people with the hearts of beasts
> Made wise concerning men.

This is your essential task : there lie the roots to be destroyed ; there new roots must be planted.

Need I add that to this union or alliance (I have avoided the many implications of the word federation) we should welcome all proper additions ? By proper I mean that if all were to come in at once—but we need not fear that—chaos would begin again. Certain precautions must be taken ; certain conditions observed. But in due time all should come in. We can only begin within our power : our power shall be after this war, after an occupation, over both conquered and conquerors. Our first task will be to weld into a moral unit the various countries who are now fighting. By a paradox frequent in history, the present enemies will be the easiest to bring together if a proper policy is followed after our victory.

MAN-POWER AND ECONOMIC ADJUSTMENT

By Professor J. H. Jones

MONEY is not an adequate measure of the economic effort necessary to wage war on a large scale. The pound is always an elastic unit ; in time of war it is apt to shrink, and after the war it rarely recovers its former state. A million pounds spent in the first year of the war of 1914-18 represented far greater economic effort than a similar sum spent in the last year of war. Broadly speaking the inter-war pound was worth little more than two-thirds of the 1913 pound. If its value had not been so reduced the burden of the war debt would have been far heavier than it proved to be. In the autumn of 1922 a fellow passenger in a German train boasted that he was a ' millionaire in marks '. A year later it needed all the marks of a million such millionaires to pay the wages of a German workman for one hour of work. For convenience it was decided to delete the twelve 0's and call it a mark. A fresh start was made, and the lesson was learnt so thoroughly that, ten years later, the risk of Hitler was preferred to the risk of abandoning even the fiction (as it had then become) of the gold standard.

We are told that the current cost of the present war is approximately £6,500,000 per day and that it will inevitably increase as the scale of operations is enlarged. Those who would encourage us point to the fact that since 1913 the national income has increased from about £2,400,000 to about £5,700,000 per annum. As a measure of war economic effort or economic burden, on the one side, and of economic productivity on the other, these figures need to be used with so much caution that in practice they are apt to be seriously misleading. In the first place the increase since 1913 in the national income expressed in money terms exaggerates the increase in the sum total of the good things of life, or of the productivity of the individual. Much of it merely represents the fall in the value of the pound

during the period ; wages, costs and prices are expressed in a different money unit, masquerading under the old name. Moreover, it will presently be shown that the constituents of the national income, or in other words the forms of economic activity, may have so changed as to make their total money value misleading as a measure of war-time efficiency.

In the second place the present money cost of the war fails to indicate the measure of the diversion represented by our war-time effort and of the burden upon our economic resources. Some of it, for example, represents food and clothing for those engaged in the fighting services ; but they were fed and clothed in time of peace. Some presumably represents expenditure of a reproductive—even profitable—character upon stocks to be sold for private consumption or used in private trading. Again, some represents expenditure at prices already far higher than those previously prevailing, for comparable commodities, and therefore exaggerates the economic effort diverted to the prosecution of the war. The cost per ton (or per man-hour) of building ships to-day is considerably higher than in time of peace, so that a given amount spent on ships represents far less utilization of economic resources than at an earlier date. In spite of all the efforts made to prevent so-called inflation it is highly probable that the rise in costs during the first six months of the present war is relatively greater than in the corresponding period of the last war. An economic fact is not changed by a change in the label. The real ' inflation ' that took place during the last war was the repeated rise in controlled and uncontrolled prices that was caused by repeated advances in wage rates and consequently in costs, but it only became pronounced after the first year of war. On this occasion it has started much earlier, nor do we now appear to possess so effective a machinery of control as was established in the last war, or to have envisaged a national policy such as we then pursued. For these and other reasons it is impossible to estimate the real significance, in terms of economic effort, either of the present money cost of the war or of the money cost at a later stage. But we do know that in so far as the true economic effort is exaggerated, in terms of money, by a rise in wages, costs and profits, it creates the money income from which the means of payment can be found.

We have seen that expenditure, expressed in terms of money, is not a reliable measure of the economic effort needed now, and possibly later, to carry on the war. The financial problem is, of course, important. Financial policy may speed or delay victory : it may facilitate or obstruct the organization of the resources needed at the front and at home. But the fundamental problem is to adjust a peace-time economic system to meet the needs of war. In theory this appears to be simpler than the problem of adjusting a war-time economic system to meet the unknown ends of peace. In time of war the markets are guaranteed, and for practical purposes unlimited. Standardization and mass production is the order of the day. The difficulty of the problem lies in its urgency. We have to do the best that we can with the means already at our disposal or within easy reach. These are by no means the same as those available in the last war.

It will be readily agreed that the first three claims upon the resources of the nation are an adequate supply of men for the fighting forces, an adequate supply of munitions and war services, broadly interpreted, and an adequate supply of the essentials of life. Unless and until these needs are satisfied we cannot afford luxuries. Any expenditure of human effort in the provision of luxuries, here and now, which tends to impede progress in the provision of the second and third needs must be condemned as tending to delay victory. This brings us face to face with our first difficulty and one of the most important problems of policy. A large proportion of the essentials of life and a not inconsiderable proportion of the supply of war materials are imported from abroad.

In the last war we were in a highly favourable position. In the first place we held a large amount of realizable investments in other countries, and this constituted a reserve upon which we could draw in time of need. In the second place we started the war with a large annual surplus of exports over imports (including in those terms both merchandise and services) which was normally added to the fund of foreign investments. Moreover, we were able to borrow from other countries. For these reasons we were able to draw upon the resources of the outside world and to import commodities up to the limit of the available

cargo space. In all three respects the present situation is less favourable than in the last war. The fund of foreign money that we can draw upon—represented by gold, liquid assets and realizable investments—is probably much smaller than in 1913, while the purchasing power of a given fund has been reduced, since 1913, by the world rise in gold prices. The 'cash and carry' policy of the United States reduces the possible supply of foreign loans. The annual balance of payments in recent years has been far less favourable than in the years immediately preceding the last war. There is, therefore, a limit to the extent to which we can economize our human resources by drawing upon the resources of the outside world; in other words, there is a limit to the extent that we can live upon our capital or (by borrowing) upon the capital of other countries.

The position may not be so serious as we are led to believe by pessimistic producers of available statistics. Already the American banking system is being embarrassed by a surfeit of gold, and when the 'cash and carry' policy has been in operation another year gold may become so serious a menace to the American business world as to necessitate foreign lending as a measure of safety. If and when loans are made to other neutral countries they become available to those belligerent countries which control the highways of commerce, provided the credit of the latter is sufficiently strong. But we cannot proceed upon the assumption that relief of this kind will eventually be provided; as a measure of insurance it is necessary to assume a strict limit to the extent to which we are able to economize our resources in this way. Moreover, the foreign investments now held in this country must be accepted as a heritage of the past, for which we are the trustees of generations to come, and which should not be drawn upon to an extent greater than that which is absolutely necessary to secure victory. It is therefore a duty to draw as little as possible upon our accumulated foreign resources or upon the capital resources of other countries. This involves the cessation of non-essential imports and an increase in exports.

Such a policy is not, however, so simple as it appears to be. The volume of imports is determined not only by financial considerations but also by the available cargo space. The

tonnage of British ocean-going vessels now available is considerably less than in 1913 ; a much larger proportion of the total consists of tankers and other specialized ships ; the convoy system has been adopted much earlier than in the last war. It is therefore possible that, for the time being, the physical restriction upon imports is even more severe than that imposed by financial considerations.

The limitation imposed by lack of cargo space raises an economic issue of the first importance. It would clearly be a waste of valuable man power to build ships merely to facilitate the importation of commodities that serve no useful purpose in war. It would be a waste of our limited foreign resources to purchase, for the same purpose, ships now owned in foreign countries. But there are circumstances in which it would obviously be necessary to build or purchase ships for the purpose of importing war materials or essentials of life that cannot be obtained within the country. There are many intermediate cases in which the balance of gain can only be estimated upon information that the government alone possesses, and information that is normally only to be obtained by pooling the resources of several government departments. It would be folly to employ a hundred workers in agriculture, for example, if by employing fifty in the building of new ships and in producing exports for payment, a larger quantity of foodstuffs could be imported from abroad. The answer to the question can only be found by co-operation between the Ministry of Agriculture, the Admiralty (which alone can estimate the risk of losses through enemy action) and the Board of Trade. In this sphere alone there are many problems that can only be solved by co-operation between several government departments.

The relative shortage of shipping, by reducing the volume of imports that the nation can acquire, tends to improve the ' balance of payments '. But that in itself is not sufficient to guarantee that we shall be able to continue to import all that the available cargo space permits. The exports of this country have also been reduced. It is probable that the total value of our shipping services to other countries is considerably lower than in recent years. Again, before the war France and Great Britain jointly received large sums of money, representing the

annual balance of the 'traffic' of tourists from the United States of America and other parts of the world. This highly important 'invisible' export has practically disappeared.

The total reduction in exports has been so serious that the importance now attached by the government to the export trade is by no means surprising. But the difficulty of increasing the total value of our exports is undoubtedly being underestimated. In the first place the exporting industries are, in the main, those that are also essential for the production of munitions and war materials. In the second place the same group of exporting industries constitutes a smaller part of the industrial structure of the nation than in the years immediately preceding the last war. The relative decline of shipbuilding, engineering, coal mining and the production of textile products (other than rayon) is too well known to call for further comment. In a war-ridden world, where war expenditure by the belligerent countries is accompanied by expenditure upon mobilization and other incidentals of neutrality in other countries, the opportunities for developing an export trade in luxuries are none too plentiful. In the third place the terms upon which foreign trade is carried on are far less favourable to us than in time of peace. Our imports are urgently needed and we pay the price of urgency. Our exports are sold, and sold urgently, in highly competitive markets. Where, during the last war, we could charge high prices because our products were urgently needed, we now have to compete with alternative supplies. The urgency is again on our side, and we pay the price. An increasing volume of exports is needed to pay for the same volume of imports.

These considerations carry us to the heart of the problem of organizing the man-power of the nation in such a way as to bring the maximum pressure to bear upon the enemy. The external financial problem differs materially from the internal problem and (though of smaller dimensions) is far more difficult to solve than the latter. It is much easier to find pounds than to find dollars: the latter, in excess of our existing stock, must be earned by the use of man power. In an ideal economic solution we should build ships and increase exports to such an extent that the last ounce of human energy so employed meant more, but very little more, towards winning the war and fulfilling

our duty as trustees to posterity (for our foreign investments) than its utilization in any other way. In practice we should remember that the most expensive unit of our exports pays for the least urgent unit of imports. The most heavily subsidized exports will be those paying for the most expensive cigars. Again it is clear that if these considerations are to be balanced to the best advantage the closest co-operation between government departments is necessary. This is not necessarily an argument for the creation of an economic general staff, as popularly conceived : given the policy the balancing of the issues is essentially a matter for technical rather than economic experts. But it is clearly an argument for the pursuit of a national policy to which the actions of the separate government departments are related.

The change, since the last war, in the economic structure of the country has affected not only the problem of foreign trade but also that of adapting industry as a whole to the needs of a war-time economy. Reference has already been made to the relative decline of those exporting industries that are essential in time of war. To that list may be added agriculture and railway transport. Other industries have increased rapidly. There are no statistics available to enable close comparisons to be made between 1913 and 1939, but the following figures for the years 1923 and 1937 indicate the general character of the changes that have taken place. Between the two specified years the estimated total population of Great Britain, between the ages of fifteen and sixty-four, increased by 11 per cent., while the number of persons insured against unemployment, between the ages of sixteen and sixty-four, increased by 22.3 per cent. There is little doubt that the number of female workers per thousand male workers employed increased during the period, so that the reservoir of women that may be drawn into industry appears to be relatively smaller than in the last war.

The total number of insured workers employed in five declining industries (coal-mining, cotton, wool, shipbuilding and repairing, and iron and steel manufacture) decreased by 25 per cent. ; the number employed in seven ' local ' industries (including building, public utilities and the distributive trades) increased by 57 per cent. ; those employed in sixteen rapidly expanding industries

by 66 per cent. ; and those employed in the eighteen remaining industries (as defined by the Ministry of Labour) by 14 per cent. This change in the relative importance of industries was accompanied by changes in the relative growths of areas. Thus, for example, the number of insured persons (excluding agriculture) increased by 42.7 per cent. in London and the Home Counties, 7.6 per cent. in Lancashire and 4.7 per cent. in Northumberland and Durham.

Broadly speaking, the areas (and industries) that have shown least growth (or a decline) are those that were relatively important for the production of munitions and war materials in the last war. The industries that have grown rapidly are largely those that are of least importance for war. The problem of organizing both industry and man power has changed. At least some of the declining industries must again be rapidly expanded —and in the old places—while much of the labour that might have been available has migrated to an area which is the chief home of non-essential industries and is, for strategic reasons, unsuitable for the production of munitions on a large scale.

In the last war the policy of dilution was employed wheresoever possible, but the main supply of semi-skilled and unskilled workers was drawn from the neighbourhood. Those able and willing to work away from their homes could register as ' war munition volunteers ' and receive subsistence allowances when employed in other parts of the country. In this way local scarcities were relieved. Competition between firms and between districts for workers was strictly controlled.

The organization of supply will eventually become more difficult in the present war than it was in the last war, when industries essential for war constituted a larger part of the industrial structure. Already there are serious problems of supply in some industries and districts. So far, however, there appears to be little evidence of a serious attempt to apply the policy of dilution in detail or to control the competition for skilled workers. Nor is evidence lacking that in the selection of sites for essential factories the problem of labour supply is largely ignored. Already in some places there is a serious shortage of female labour while in others there is available a large supply of such labour. It is obvious that greater use

must be made, in other parts of the country, of female workers now employed in or near London.

It is not my purpose to enter into details, particularly details of a semi-technical character. I wish merely to draw attention to two general truths. The first is that the past decline of industries essential for war necessitates a larger and more rapid growth than in the last war. The workers employed in such industries cannot so easily be spared for the fighting services, even when dilution is fully operative. For this reason the fighting forces must be more heavily recruited than in the last war from those industries that expanded rapidly during the inter-war period, including 'local' industries, such as building, the domestic trades and the clerical services. The oft quoted statement that this is a war of blackcoated workers is not without an element of truth. The second is that the efficient organization of supply will probably necessitate more migration and migration over greater distances than in the last war. The dispersal of the residents of London will be followed by the migration of workers to places at which they are likely to be needed for work of national importance.

The failure to recognize this need constitutes part of the difficulty in deciding between the relative merits of spending and saving. Abstinence seems to create unemployment while spending seems to give employment precisely where it is needed. In so far as this is true it largely indicates the slowness with which the government machine is doing its work. If abstinence causes unemployment in one place spending retards the movement of the otherwise unemployed workers to places at which employment is already available. In spite of the fact that over a million employable workers are unemployed the demand for workers in essential industries is greater than the supply. After six months of war, following many more months of preparation. abstinence should be a virtue in so far as it is a virtue at any period of a ' total ' war.

It seems to me that there is a serious defect in the present organization and control of supplies, including the organization of labour. It is of the essence of business organization that finance, contracts, production and labour should be under the same general control. It was so in the Ministry of Munitions

during the last war. As a servant of the Ministry I saw its operations every day for nearly two years. As an officer in the wages department I was in continuous contact with the dilution and labour supply department, the contracts department and the production department. It could not be otherwise. All dealt with aspects of the same problem. In this war the labour problem, in all its parts, is left to the Ministry of Labour. Supply, as meant by the Ministry of Supply, is confined to materials, and excludes one essential of efficient supply, which is labour. It is not unlikely that part of the cause of the slowness of the transition from a peace economy to a full blooded war economy is to be found in this divorce and the lack of a policy covering two inseparable parts of a single problem.

THE CONTEMPT OF LEARNING IN 20TH CENTURY ENGLAND

By Dorothy L. Sayers

WE were sitting idly in the garden at the time . . . This habit of idling in gardens is extremely dangerous. There is something about it that prompts the asking of random questions. Look at Eve in Paradise, for example. Or Socrates, dawdling among the flower-pots in other people's domestic peristyles. It is well known what happened to both of them. Parents and practical men have a rooted distrust of random questions—rightly, since you never know what they may lead to. At worst, they may disturb fundamental assumptions; at best, one thing may lead to another till you find yourself landed with a job of work.

I swear that when I started the hare I had no intention of running after it. But my companion was a colleague and collaborator of long standing; we are only too well accustomed to following each other's view-halloo. Before we knew where we were we found ourselves committed, like a twin Palomides, to the pursuit of the Questing Beast. It looks like being a long and exhausting chase, and we shall probably need the help of other hunters. I am putting down this note of our original conversation in the hope that those others may join in, and thus provide material for the inevitable book which we see looming at the end of the run.

Ego (*dropping Demant's "Religious Prospect" in the middle of a difficult passage about dialectics*): Look here—when did we *start* this contempt of learning?

Alter Ego (*waking up reluctantly*): Which? What?

Ego: Since when have we used the word "intellectual" as a term of abuse? When did we first coin phrases like "brainy" and "highbrow" to express our contempt and dislike of education? When did these sneers at any kind of academic learning begin?

ALTER EGO: I don't know that I've ever thought about when it began, exactly.

EGO: I suppose it was the Industrial Revolution, as usual.

ALTER EGO: (*a little severely*) One can't just put everything down to the Industrial Revolution, without any evidence. One would have to look up contemporary allusions.

EGO: Yes—in fiction, on the stage, and especially in popular journalism. That's where one finds it most to-day. Savage attacks on poetical plays. Sneers at schoolmarms. Eulogies of plain, practical politicians. "We don't want uplift from the B.B.C." "Women don't want careers." "Take away this dull theology and give us some nice religious feeling." That sort of thing. When did it start? If you look at the back numbers of *Punch* . . .

ALTER EGO: I can't. The British Museum has sent all the Periodicals away to Hendon. Every possible obstacle is set in the path of research.

EGO: Curse it. As if toiling over periodicals wasn't bad enough anyhow. . . . Of course, the English have always liked the "plain man" who was no orator. Shakespeare knew that. But the common man did respect learning. In the Middle Ages. . . .

ALTER EGO: "Mediæval" also is a term of abuse.

EGO: I don't care . . . people didn't take it for granted that poets and scholars must be dreamy inefficients, out of touch with practical affairs. They didn't say, "Thomas à Becket, *though* a learned clerk, is a vigorous statesman." They didn't think it odd that Sidney should be a soldier, or that Raleigh should embellish world-history with colonies and potatoes in addition to a treatise. Henry VIII could argue theology and Elizabeth write several languages, and nobody said, "How peculiar!"—though they may have said "How gratifying!" Even down to the 19th century, a politician was expected to quote Greek in the Commons. What would happen to anybody who did that now?

ALTER EGO (*grimly*): Ha, ha! . . . That kind of thing belongs to a time when government was in the hands of an educated aristocracy.

EGO: But the Tories would resent it to-day just as much

as Labour. The privileged classes are the first to complain that Oxford did them no good, and anyway, education is no longer confined to the aristocracy.

ALTER EGO (*really awake now and taking a firm grip on the subject*) : I wonder if that's how it all began. The more the masses are educated, the less value is placed on learning. I think we ought to look into the beginnings of the movement for educating workers and women. They are the two " slave " classes, and privilege always fears and resents the extension of power to depressed classes, and defends itself by sneers and jeers. There was a very serious and sustained opposition to women's and workers' education in the last century.

EGO : Oh, yes—those old numbers of *Punch* . . .

ALTER EGO : The organ of the privileged classes. . . .

EGO : . . . are full of sneers and jeers. (*Triumphantly*) So it probably *is* connected with the Industrial Revolution. . . . But how about Dr. Johnson's dog ? And the ridicule poured on the early Bluestockings ?

ALTER EGO : That may have been merely incidental—rather because the women were pedants than because they were women. The English have never loved Holofernes, in or out of petticoats. But in the Middle Ages. . . .

EGO : It is your turn to name them.

ALTER EGO (*firmly*) : In the Middle Ages learning and poverty went together. It was not the aristocrats but the poor scholars who flocked to the Universities, and the oldest of the colleges were founded and endowed especially for their free education. During the Renaissance, education was not exclusively a male privilege ; the daughters of a man like Sir Thomas More had the same education as their brothers and shared the same tutor.

EGO : I have heard a historian say that the fashion for the lower education of women began with the development of what we now know as the " public-school system ", when foundations like Harrow, originally intended for the "locals", became boarding-establishments for the sons of the nobility and gentry. The boys were sent away to be educated by the best teachers, and the girls were left at home to do needlework with the governess, so that learning became a privilege of sex.

ALTER EGO : And, for the same reason, a class-privilege too.

Our early tradition was liberal and aristocratic—that is, it catered for an aristocracy, not of money, but of talents, the idea being that education should be available to all who were capable of it.

EGO : I must put in a word for the Church. She was our first educator and she acknowledged an essential equality in all men, which gave them a right to the full development of their natural gifts.

ALTER EGO : Well, that is true. She was also the road by which men improved their social position, and so she still is in Ireland—and I think in Scotland too. But in England we get the emergence of a very prosperous middle class with no tradition of learning behind it, rising to power, not (like Wolsey, for instance) through the Church and education, but through smart business methods and commercial opportunity. People whose power is conferred by money always resent any superiority shown by their economic dependents.

EGO : Was it only the commercial magnate that was in fault ? Wingfield-Stratford dates the intellectual decay of the English governing classes from the French Revolution, which broke our traditional link with European culture. The landed gentry feared the mob, and distrusted, not only the French nation, but also the English poets and writers who supported the revolutionary cause.

ALTER EGO : The two things would work together. As power passed from the land to the shop-counter, the landowner hastened on the intellectual collapse by turning traitor to his own tradition. When the gentry became " stupid and proud of it ", they sold the pass to the financier without background or sense of responsibility, whose only ability consists in knowing how to trick abler men than himself.

EGO : You are hard on the business man and the financier.

ALTER EGO : They are not likely to support the cause of learning. Why should they ? Their prosperity, and their whole life, is based on the notion that everything has its price ; they are bound to resent the mental integrity that cannot be bought or sold. They will resent it and despise it at the same time, because on the one hand it defeats them and, on the other, it puts a value on something which produces little or no financial

rewards. To them, learning is like a horrible heresy, a rival religion, which they dare not allow, because it questions the very foundations of their universe.

EGO (*picking up "The Religious Prospect" and dusting a garden spider from the page*): All conflicts are, in the end, religious conflicts. This is an era of secular religions, and you will always find resentment against anything that appeals to an absolute standard beyond the temporal and practical requirements of economic and political progress. It is all the same, whether the opposition comes from German Totalitarianism or Liberal Industrialism. Though, now I think of it, Liberal Industrialism was a great pioneer for the education of the masses.

ALTER EGO: Was it the industrialists? or Liberalism as such?

EGO: Well, both. Liberal doctrine proclaimed the right to equal opportunity, though Demant says here, it was unaware how thoroughly it had become impregnated with a determinist "dogma", or set of assumptions, that denied its conscious doctrine. But I think enlightened industry was persuaded to back the movement to give the workers education, on the ground that an educated worker would do better work.

ALTER EGO: I expect that is true. (We must really look up these dates). But the worker might be excused for looking with suspicion on a Greek gift of that sort. And in fact, you will still find a strong persuasion among working men that the governing classes are in a conspiracy to give them the wrong sort of education—that is, an education designed to keep them "in their place".

EGO: Yet they wanted education and clamoured for it. Indeed, they clamour for it still, though I doubt whether they would like "upper-class" education even if they had it. They would probably find it as disappointing as the "upper classes" now find it themselves. All the same, when a working man finds himself at a disadvantage, he is quick to attribute his troubles to lack of education.

ALTER EGO: I believe that is the root of the trouble. They expect the wrong kind of satisfaction from education. I fancy we have there the resentment of unprivileged people who have

secured education and have then discovered that it is not the panacea they had confidently hoped.

EGO (*angrily*): Everybody to-day is looking for a panacea. There is no such thing. It is a sorcerer's dream. What do people expect of education? Happiness? The greater the wisdom, the greater the sorrow. Or a sure passport to employment? Nobody finds it so to-day. The book-learning of Oxford and Cambridge in their hey-day supplied only posts in the Church, the School and the Law. Now, the Universities are hindered in the provision of true learning for genuine scholars, because they are swamped with demands for "vocational" training—which means, God save the mark! training for paid employment for which the student neither has nor hopes to have a vocation. Nor does this vocational training succeed in getting the desired employment. Besides, it is this very vocational training of which the workers complain, because it keeps them workers, instead of enlarging their opportunities. There is a vicious circle here.

ALTER EGO: The truth is that those who desire learning for its own sake are very few, and their reward is neither in wealth and comfort nor in happiness (whatever we mean by that) but only in learning itself. But the workers have other causes for resentment—for instance a certain resentment against the influence of the teacher, which tends to diminish home-influence—especially as, with successive improvements, school becomes a pleasanter place than the working-class home.

EGO: We should reform the homes. In our own class, of course, we are used to the clash between parental and school interests and influence. Mothers and fathers make a wry face when their children contradict them and preface every assertion with "Miss Jones says", and they often complain that "Bobby is so bound up in his school life that he takes no interest in his home". But they know it for a passing phase and are resigned; or at least, if they don't like it, they know they must lump it.

ALTER EGO: They are disciplined by tradition. And though little Bobby and Joan go through a cock-sure, "superior" period at a public school, they shake down eventually. They do not become *permanently* superior to their parents in speech and manners. That is what causes resentment.

EGO : The workers do also tend to be possessive about their children, as evacuation shewed pretty clearly. Our parents submit with a pretty good grace to the removal of their children to distant places. The public-school habit has trained them.

ALTER EGO : And to them, their children are only one interest among many. To the working mother, living a dull and penurious life, her children are all she has. Take them and you take all. She cannot fall back on games or travel or amusements or social activities.

EGO : May we not also add that the tradition of the working-classes has been to regard their families as a financial asset ? The little peasant went out to scare birds, the little industrialist to work in the factory. They were expected to contribute to the family income and to the support of their parents in old age ; and the tradition still persists. Compulsory education. . . .

ALTER EGO : There is one of the things the privileged classes don't have to put up with—compulsion. However much one may desire a benefit, one resents being compelled to receive it. " If reasons were as plentiful as blackberries . . ."

EGO : Very true. Real liberty is liberty to bind one's self. It is disgusting to be liberated by force. And seeing that compulsory education converts the children of the poor from a financial asset into a liability, and that every extension of the school age prolongs their period of economic uselessness, it is no wonder if education provokes a sub-conscious resistance, especially as it involves a break with long-established tradition.

ALTER EGO : I agree that the resistance is sub-conscious. The people really want their children to be educated and " get a good start in life " ; but the hidden resentment is there.

EGO : Whereas the tradition of the professional and privileged classes is all the other way. They assume financial responsibility for their children till a late age—till twenty-one at least, and later in the case of a doctor or lawyer.

ALTER EGO : They can afford to take the long view, The poor cannot. It is all a question of economics. If the country doctor cannot pay for his children, they will get no education—unless the State intervenes.

EGO : Obviously not ; but in that case, the parents will

feel themselves to be out-castes, being accustomed to couple privilege with responsibility.

ALTER EGO : May be. But is not the " responsibility " of the propertied classes for their children only a long-range method of making them into financial assets ? In the 18th century, the younger sons held down the family appointments and the family living, and in the 19th they devoted themselves to the making of fortunes in the colonies, just as the daughters enlarged the family estates by alliance. The whole thing was based on the worship of landed property.

EGO : But the sense of responsibility persists, though the landed property has become a liability. That is, the upper classes, even when they have lost their governing privileges, still feel it somehow their duty to accord their children the " privilege " of a prolonged adolescence.

ALTER EGO : More prolonged than ever. In Tudor times one left the University at sixteen, married at seventeen . . .

EGO : And died at fifty, with the effigies of three wives and a score of children to decorate one's sepulchral monument. Is it true that sons and daughters in funerary brass were mass-manufactured and could be purchased by the yard ?

ALTER EGO : Perfectly true.

EGO : With special reductions, no doubt, for taking a quantity. Happily the death-rate kept pace with so fantastic a birth-rate. But I think myself we now prolong adolescence too much. The psychological effect is bad, and leads to a refusal of responsibility, to say nothing of some very unedifying perversions. There must be measure in all things.

ALTER EGO : Nobody believes in measure nowadays. It is called compromise. That is another good word that has become a term of abuse. But while I agree with what you say about the discipline, duties, and so on, of the traditional aristocracy, I must point out that these people are responsible for one of the ugliest aspects of the present contempt of learning—namely that in England (alone, I think, among civilized countries) the teacher's profession is despised. What is the use of our saying that the future is with the young and that education is the key to reconstruction, if we ourselves pay no honour to those who do the work of education ? We hand our

children over to them, and at the same time undermine their prestige and treat them as social pariahs. The appearance of a school-teacher on stage or screen is automatically greeted with yells of laughter. In books or conversation, our allusions to them are scornful if not actually scurrilous. Our nation enjoys an evil eminence in this. Nowhere else need an educator apologize for his calling. Nowhere else does a clever and cultivated woman feel obliged to confess, with a shamefaced grin, at dinner-parties : " Well, as a matter of fact, I'm an Oxford don " or, " I'm afraid I lead a dreadful hidden life in a High School ". A friend of mine (who belongs to this contemptible class) says that the invariable answer is : " Oh, *how* interesting ! "—followed by a hasty and embarrassed change of subject.

EGO : We all feel the same about it. I led that hidden life myself for a year, and always unveil it with a facetious reference to my hideous past. But things are not as bad now as they were in the last century, when the governess and the usher were not only the slaves of their employers and the butt of comic literature, but also scandalously underpaid.

ALTER EGO : They are still underpaid, though not quite so scandalously. The contempt was, I think, largely that of a commercial oligarchy for those who had brought their pigs to the wrong market. We are back to the old complaint against the commercial mind, and hatred of the unbuyable. And I don't think we need look much further for the contempt of the scholar in parliament and public life. But the masses are as bad as the classes : they help to vote the business man into power, and complain of him when he is there.

EGO : I have been told that Labour's distrust of the intelligentzia in parliament dates from the 1931 crisis, when all the " intellectuals " of their party " ratted ".

ALTER EGO : That probably helped ; though I fancy the distrust is of longer standing. But so long as it costs money to become a parliamentary candidate, we shall continue to be governed by commercial interests.

EGO : The War may do something there ; it will leave us all poor together.

ALTER EGO : I sincerely hope so. I do not want to be

poor, but I should be glad to know that we were all in the same boat. And we ought to take the opportunity of this upheaval to get our minds straight—privileged and unprivileged alike—about the real aims of education.

EGO : We have scarcely touched on those, and they are not plainly defined anywhere. The curricula of schools and universities betray everywhere a lamentable confusion of purpose. I perceive with regret that we shall end by writing a book.

ALTER EGO : I was coming to the same dismal conclusion. I think we had better make a few notes now.

EGO : By all means. I will supply pencil and paper and you shall do the work. Begin. We will call the book " The Contempt of Learning in 20th Century England ". (That will limit the terms of reference). " How it started ; why it started ; how it manifests itself."

ALTER EGO : We shall find that contempt displayed

(1) In the direct written evidence of novel and play, of criticism, of newspaper correspondence and of journalism—particularly in the decline of the literary and specialist periodicals and the shockingly low standard of reviewing.

(2) In the general attitude to the educational profession and to non-utilitarian subjects, in the progressive commercialization of University curricula and in the growing tendency to separate practical knowledge from learning.

EGO : I think we shall find it linked up with the whole modern tendency to separate thought from life.

ALTER EGO : Oh, undoubtedly. But in examining the interplay of cause and effect, we shall have to deal in detail with all those resentments against education which we have unearthed this afternoon.

EGO : After which we must, I suppose, suggest a remedy. Otherwise, we too shall be separating thought from life—and what is more, the practical public will not buy the book.

ALTER EGO : Alas ! yes. The second part of the work will have to offer a synthesis. Any practical scientist can analyse ; synthesis is creative—that is why it is so rare.

EGO : This looks horridly like a job of work. I wish we had never begun it. How did we begin ?

ALTER EGO : You began it. You asked a question.

EGO : Heaven forgive me ! . . . I am tired of sitting in the garden. Besides, it is going to rain and the clock has struck five. Let us go in, Socrates, and have tea.

THE SWISS CONFEDERATION AND THE WAR

By Elizabeth Wiskemann

FOR Switzerland the year 1940 opened with the death of Giuseppe Motta, the *Ticinese* who had conducted the foreign policy of the Helvetic Confederation for some twenty years. The first question to be settled was who should fill his place in the Bundesrat, a College of Seven Men which is in fact the supreme Swiss Federal executive body; the second who should succeed him in the position of Secretary for Foreign Affairs.

Members of the *Bundesrat* or Federal Council are elected by the National Assembly, *i.e.*, the two Chambers sitting in joint session ; of these Chambers one has 44 members, 2 nominated or elected by each of the 22 Cantons, the other is elected by P.R. by the Swiss people as a whole, and at present contains 187 members. No Canton may have more than one representative in the Federal Council, and while it is customary for German-speaking Zürich and French-speaking Vaud to provide a Federal Councillor each, the Italian-speaking Ticino had been represented by Signor Motta uninterruptedly since 1911 ; the other four *Bundesräte* at the beginning of this year, since Switzerland is three-quarters German-speaking, were naturally from the so-called *Ostschweiz*. The major non-Socialist political parties are, within practical limits, also proportionately represented in the Federal Council.

Immediately after Signor Motta's death, great uncertainty prevailed as to who should fill his place. It was generally agreed that it should be someone from his, the Catholic-Conservative Party, and the names most often suggested were those of Monsieur Aeby, the rector of the Catholic University of the (roughly) two-thirds French and one-third German-speaking canton of Fribourg, and of the Catholic Monsieur Troillet, a politician from Valais, a canton of similar linguistic

composition which has never yet, apparently, been represented in the Federal Executive; the name of the Protestant, Dr. Burckhardt, Ex-League of Nations representative at Danzig, although he was no local politician but rather a man of letters, was also heard. The Federal Parliament was due to meet in Berne on February 19, and the election of the new Federal Councillor was fixed for the following Thursday, February 22—fixed, indeed, in true Swiss fashion, to take place at 8.30 in the morning. As the day approached the Ticino seemed to re-assert itself, for the feeling grew that, especially in critical times, the three official language groups of the Confederation should all have the fullest recognition, and that if the Italian-speaking Swiss were numerically few, Swiss relations with Italy in the Spring of 1940 might be of quite particular importance.

Another well-worn controversy had also entered into the game. The Social Democrats are the second-largest party in the National Council with only a seat or so less than the Radicals or *Freisinnige Partei*. The Federal Council is not responsible to the National Assembly or Council (since it always remains in office for four years) and has never been regarded as a one party Cabinet working against a recognized opposition; it has therefore seemed to many Swiss, more particularly since the Allies were forced to declare war upon Germany, that in spite of bitter polemics between the Swiss Socialists and the other political parties, the Social Democrats represented an element of such importance in national life that they too should appear in the Federal Executive. In order to facilitate a change of this kind it was indeed suggested that a constitutional reform be introduced and the Federal Council expanded from seven members to nine. The Socialists have shown themselves to be divided over the whole issue, the older people favouring a share in national responsibility, while the younger ones prefer to retain a right to unrestrained criticism.

In the end the election of the new Federal Councillor developed into a three-cornered contest between Monsieur Troillet and two Ticinese, one Catholic-Conservative and one Social-Democrat. Indeed Monsieur Troillet fell into the rear, for the Catholic, Signor Celio, was successfully elected with the Socialist, Signor Canevascini, in the second place. The new Minister, having

received a bouquet of flowers and having delivered himself of a charming little speech in his native Italian, was quickly sworn in to serve the Confederation truly; the National Assembly then passed, characteristically enough, to the election of a deputy judge to the Federal Tribunal which is established at the Vaudois capital, Lausanne. The Federal Council had now to distribute the Ministries among the Seven Men, for in this distribution the popular voice even in Switzerland is not heard. On March 1 it was announced that the Vaudois Federal Councillor, Monsieur Pilet-Golaz, who is also for this year the President of the Swiss Federal Executive, would take over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Signor Celio succeeds him as Minister for Railways and Postal communications. It is not without interest that two French-speaking Swiss from the *Canton de Vaud* now occupy the key positions in war-time Switzerland—Monsieur Pilet-Golaz as Foreign Minister and General Guisan, who was also elected by the National Assembly in September, as head of the Army. Judging by the ubiquity of photographs of the General, he is immensely popular. And it should perhaps be mentioned, incidentally, that the French-speaking Swiss comprise only about one-fifth of the whole population of the Confederation.

Since September Switzerland has been mobilized to defend her neutrality. One sees uniforms everywhere, there is a certain shortage of skilled labour and a grave financial problem as to how mobilization can be paid for over any length of time. Swiss firms are bound to accept certain blockade restrictions. Yet apart from these things Switzerland appears to be living her normal life, electing officials and discussing local affairs in her communal, cantonal and national assemblies. Appearances, however, have always deceived the unwary. Should the foreign visitor slip in to listen to the discussions of the Zürich Town Council on a Wednesday afternoon, he will find air-raid protection being discussed, if he indiscreetly raises his eyes in a Zürich tram he may find that an up-to-date leather firm is advertising the necessity for buying all sorts of leather goods which might help one to pack up in a hurry. The second and chief line of Swiss defence was along the river Limmat through Zürich; north of this, right on the frontiers, Basle tea-parties discuss

nothing but the chances, if any, of getting away. In Western Switzerland, however, there is no anxiety of this kind.

The fact is that the Swiss, for all their neutrality, are profoundly concerned by the present war. They know that, if it suits her, Germany may assault them at any time, and they know the corollary—that the future liberty of the small nation, as of the individual, depends upon the success of the Allies against Germany. Thus the German danger is the theme of Swiss life. So long as no German forces have crossed the frontier the struggle is unseen ; it consists on the one hand in foiling German propaganda and sabotage preparations within Switzerland, on the other in controlling the expression of Swiss opinion, for instance in the press, in order that Germany shall not discover provocation.

The Nazis have always regarded Switzerland, mainly German-speaking as it is, as their " rightful " booty, and they have pursued their standard policy of undermining in advance. Their readiest tools, probably, have been the large number of German citizens domiciled in Switzerland who have not been called home since the outbreak of war ; the degree to which these Germans are organized can be gauged by the fact that even the German invalids at Leysin have their *Gauleiter*. Among the Swiss National Socialism was able to attract converts in the Spring of 1933, and a pro-Nazi ' National Front ' was founded. This subsequently crumbled into various fragmentary organizations, which soon ceased to have any political importance from the point of view of affecting Swiss public opinion, but which were nevertheless convenient instruments in the hands of Gestapo agents. Already before the outbreak of war a group of " Confederates " led by a certain Zander was condemned for conspiring with Germans. The Gestapo works mainly from Stuttgart, but also from Carlsruhe, against Switzerland. For some time a pro-Nazi paper, called the *Neue Basler Zeitung*, was a great convenience from the German point of view ; it was always quoted in Germany as a tone mirror of Swiss views ; a certain Rolf Henne, who was on the staff of the *Neue Basler*, received money from Germany to write a history of Switzerland which he never, apparently, even began. Another enthusiastic Swiss Nazi, Major Leonhardt, disappeared

to Frankfurt (on the Main) when the war began. Since then various Swiss accomplices of Germany have been ignominiously arrested, and all these activities culminated at the beginning of March in the implication of the 'National Front' itself, hitherto regarded as the most moderate of the pro-German group. With the temporary arrest of its leader, Dr. Tobler, a national deputy until October, 1939, the National Front also is revealed as less naïf than the tolerant had supposed; as the *Neue Zürcher Zeitung* has written, its consequent self-dissolution will not discourage the Swiss authorities from keeping a vigilant eye upon those who have worked with it. The recent posting of anti-Ally pamphlets in Zürich and Lucerne letter-boxes may have had something to do with the steps now taken against the friends of the Nazis in Switzerland.

The main German pressure against Switzerland, however, has hitherto come from without, and it has taken the shape of a press and general *Kultur* dispute. The practical control of the press in Switzerland has been consigned, since the outbreak of war, to a military commission, the *Abteilung für Presse und Funkspruch*, in order that Swiss neutrality shall be strictly maintained to the satisfaction of the Army which is responsible in the last instance for defending it; considerable friction between journalists and the officers concerned has inevitably resulted. When the *Neue Basler Zeitung* was forbidden in Switzerland shortly before Christmas, the German press, of course, took umbrage, and since the New Year it has persistently busied itself in piling up grievances. Indeed in Germany's newspaper campaign of intimidating the smaller neutrals in general, Switzerland in particular has been singled out. Even when the main abuse has been directed against Sweden, the country responsible for the disruption of Germany by the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, a threat against Switzerland, which won its independence of Germany through the self-same Treaties, is but thinly concealed. Not only, the German press complains, is Dr. Goebbels's demand that, in addition to their published statements, the public opinion of neutral countries shall be neutral rejected by Switzerland (in accordance with international law), but also the Germans assert that the Confederation bestows a *Schimpffreiheit* or licence to abuse Germany upon its

citizens; Swiss people travelling in Germany are liable to be asked by docile newspaper-readers why Swiss opinion is "aggressively" hostile towards the Reich. The *Berliner Börsen-Zeitung* has specialized in scolding Switzerland, but the *Völkische Beobachter*, *Westdeutsche Beobachter* and the Stuttgart press have eagerly joined in the attack, and even the *Frankfurter Zeitung* has recently entered the fray. So systematic has the German press campaign been that it has appeared not altogether unlike the journalistic artillery-fire which is apt to precede a Nazi invasion. In view of the new problem of conveying German coal to Italy by land it is likely to be intensified at any moment in order to bring pressure to bear upon Switzerland to facilitate the use of Swiss trucks and the St. Gotthard route.

On the whole the Swiss public is primarily afraid the *Abteilung für Presse und Funkspruch* and the Federal Council, to which the *Abteilung* is subordinate, have shown a dangerous timidity in response to Germany's indictments; timidity, after all is notoriously the way to encourage the natural bully. Both the Liberal *National Zeitung* of Basle and the popular Zürich weekly *Die Weltwoche* have been reproved by the military censors, and difficulties of this kind were made for the *Weltwoche* at about the same time as it was furiously attacked by the *Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt* in its issue of February 2. In fact, at about this moment, both the *Weltwoche* and the *Basler Nachrichten* were bringing out accounts of life in Germany which could only be extremely unwelcome in Berlin, and the greater difficulties encountered by the *Weltwoche* are difficult to explain except as the result of some kind of administrative confusion.

Swiss indignation probably reached a climax when the Federal Council banned first the German, then all editions, of Dr. Rauschning's *Gespräche mit Hitler* or "Hitler speaks". The French translation had been selling for weeks when the German Edition, which, of course, conveys the full force of Hitler's words with more effect, was published in Zürich. The German Minister in Berne protested in no measured terms. A few confused days intervened. The Federal Council then issued its series of prohibitions, implying as earnestly as it was able that they had only been delayed through bureaucratic error. Cautious people approved of the ban since the Book

touched Herr Hitler personally and might induce some wild outburst of rage, but many of the Swiss were inclined to ask how, since the book would not be allowed into Germany, did it concern the Reich ? The incident provided the occasion for an exceedingly interesting debate in the Federal Parliament on February 21, in which the principle of the freedom of the Swiss Press and of Swiss publishing was fully discussed and eagerly vindicated ; the Government promised an amelioration in the system of censorship.

For the moment this prelude to the storms that March may bring appears to be over. Germany is posing before Switzerland and all the world as the resolute liberator determined to vanquish British domination and to sweep away the broken-down social system upon which it is based. This positive appeal combines with the relative inactivity of the Allies (an Altmark incident weekly would have done us no harm) and the ground very gradually lost by the Finns to shake Swiss sympathies more effectively than the hectoring words of the *Stuttgarter Neues Tagblatt.* It is to such German claims that France and Britain need to return a confident and a convincing reply.

CONDITIONS FOR A RECOVERY OF CIVILIZATION

By J. Huizinga

IN the Spring of 1935 I tried to make up a brief account of the general situation and the outlook for Western civilization.* I called it a diagnosis, because it seemed to me undeniable that we were confronted with a serious distemper of social life. Misgivings about the solidity of our civilization had then less generally spread than they have now. Warning signs of possible downfall or decay were less conspicuous than they have become since. The political order, as it had been established after the great war, though far from reassuring, was on the whole still undisturbed. Italy had not yet started her campaign in Abyssinia, the fire in Spain was still smouldering, the Rhineland had not yet been remilitarized, Central Europe was chaffing but outwardly quiet, and Russia seemed on the way to regain her place in the European system. But for anybody looking beyond the outward appearance of political conditions all the symptoms of cultural deterioration and threatening decay were as easily recognizable as they are now. Leaving aside economical and social problems and considering only the mental situation of our Western world, the outlook seemed by no means cheerful. First of all, a survey of intellectual conditions could not fail to leave the impression of a general weakening of the average power of judgment in the individual and in the masses. The age of technical achievement and universal education, instead of effecting the high degree of mental progress once expected of it, had brought the rather disquieting result of a decline of the critical spirit which once had made possible a society based on scientific knowledge. Shallowness of thought and dissipation of mental energy seemed to have invaded all classes everywhere.

Moreover, the intellectual principle itself, as one of the main

*In the Shadow of To-morrow, English edition, London, Heinemann, 1936.

directives of life, had in many parts been forsaken for systems of philosophy extolling life in its crude state above thinking. Moral standards had been deliberately dropped in ever wider circles, either by conviction or by fashion, without being replaced by any new principle in life.

If now, after five years, we ask ourselves, whether the prospect for civilization has brightened, a negative answer will seem almost inevitable. The ailments have not been cured and could not have been. Their effects, in the shape of follies, inhumanities, waste of energy and the like, have grown ten times worse than they were, manifesting themselves in a succession of acts of violence and perfidy that has culminated in the outbreak of the new war. If for the moment cultural preoccupations worry us less than they did before, it is simply because now the all-important political issue crowds out concerns of a more theoretical kind and absorbs all our faculties. Perhaps it is not exclusively the state of war which is responsible for this absorption of our mind by political questions. This evergrowing concentration on the political is itself to be regarded as a symptom of our cultural disease. Society at large and the human individual personally have less and less time and attention to spare for pursuits of life outside the political and economical sphere. The importance of the political seems so overwhelming that we are apt to forget that politics and economics together only form part of that nether domain of human activity which the Greek called the acquisitive art. Now if we still agree that the acquisitive life does not mean civilization, at least not the whole of it, there is no need for pointing out that the absorption of mental faculties by the political and economic purposes of society raises grave fears as to the healthy state of our civilization. In a paper which should have been read in 1938 before an audience in Vienna, if Vienna had remained Austrian*, I ventured to call this process the sliding-down of civilization into the political, *das Abgleiten der Kultur in das Politische.* Politics, however important and unavoidable, are always a secondary function of human life. They can never be either the essence or the ultimate pursuit of a civilization. Their aims

**Der Mensch und die Kultur, Schriftenreihe Ausblicke,* Bermann-Fischer Verlag, Stockholm, 1938.

are limited, their views restricted, their results provisional, their means clumsy and inefficient, and their preponderance merely a "cursed plight".

If it be granted that for the recovery of civilization we want something more than the adjustment of international disputes, we can now proceed to ask ourselves, whether there are any signs of a coming betterment to be detected. Let us suppose a general peace concluded on the best terms we can imagine for the near future. This would mean: Law and order restored, as far as that goes, safety against aggression more or less guaranteed, for the smaller units of political society as well as for the large ones, a regular practice of diplomatic communication in terms of decent behaviour taken up again, the possibility of world trade reopened, the danger of a submersion of human culture by despotism and the systematic enslaving of fellow-creatures dispelled. If these conditions were fulfilled, would then the road be free for civilization to resume its upward course? Five years ago doubts about the future of civilization were still so rare that the possibility of its down-fall rather than of survival was in question. To-day it is the possibility of redress which seems doubtful. In the present article we can hardly do more than to point out some grave obstacles standing in the way of recovery of a healthy state of civilization. We might call these obstacles *Idola*, after Bacon's fashion, sources of error in judgment and action, impeding a favourable development of human faculties. But before we come to these general obstacles we have first to allude to some extremely unpleasant facts which await us in the near future as a legacy of the present war. Part of the world will be mentally rotten to the core as the result of the systematic heaping-up of nonsense and falsehood which sticks to civilization like a crust of decomposition not to be removed either by reason or education. Whole generations will have been spoilt by the teaching of absurd and malicious doctrines and the training in sterile occupations. When the dismal work of goalers, spies, denouncers and slave-drivers comes to an end, a host of these elements will still remain, a burden to the social life and civilization of their native communities, a pest to their surroundings and a lasting hindrance to the revaluation of culture. Nobody can as yet

foresee how the very urgent task of clearing the ground of these poisonous weeds will be handled. But it seems safe to say that only those nations and groups which have escaped the extremes of mental infection can furnish a starting-point for the process of recovery and renascence.

Among the general obstacles referred to above surely the most essential is a deep-lying habit common to the whole of modern mankind, *viz.*, the glorification of size and quantity. Ever since the human mind began to lose hold of the old Aristotelian system of measuring the world by quality the opposite tendency set in of over-estimating the importance of quantity. Modern science was built up on quantitative analysis. It revealed dimensions and distances in the universe challenging our imagination of infinity. Technology learnt to accumulate masses of energy unthinkable before. Politics through the boundless extension of the means and methods of exercising power became the victim of its own limitless possibilities of destructive action. It was forgotten in the meantime that the lasting values of civilization have always sprung up in very restricted circumstances of power and output, and that the big State as such never added a single one to them. The idol of bigness once set up continues to devour us. This over-emphasis on size and quantity pervades our social thinking of to-day to such a degree that by this alone the way back to real civilization seems badly blocked.

The next obstacle to be mentioned here is of a subtler character. I am inclined to call it modern man's inaccessibility to persuasion. Perhaps former ages were not much better than ours in this respect. All the same, as a feature of social life it is very striking just now. On the face of it it is in contradiction to what we should be allowed to expect. Man is supposed to be a reasonable being. If he really were, his mind when holding some opinion should yield to such arguments as proved its untenableness. But in actual fact it seldom shows itself willing or capable to do so, even on scientific matters, not to speak of political or confessional opinions. It is quite probable that in some of the earlier periods in history the power of the logical argument to convince a man of being wrong was much greater than it is now. The Greeks attached a great importance to the art

of persuading other men. We all have heard about Persuasion sitting on the lips of Pericles. Persuasion was the Sophist's professional art. The whole Platonic dialogue would lose its sense without a certain amount of susceptibility to persuasion by argument. The same holds good of later epochs of a markedly intellectualist type, *e.g.*, those of the wars of religion, and of rationalism. Conversions between the Catholic and the Protestant side were always frequent. They presuppose a susceptibility to conviction which to-day would seem almost entirely lost. Has there ever been a Fascist or a Communist who allowed himself to be cured by having it expounded to him that his premises were wrong ?

This imperviousness of modern man to reason is the more surprising because universal education ought to have moulded him into a flexible thinking and doubting being. In a talk about the increasing rigidity of mind among the younger generations M. Paul Valéry put in the remark : " *Mais Monsieur, le doute se perd.*"

Instead of that pale but venerable goddess called *Peitho*, Persuasion, we have now Propaganda. Propaganda is the art of making other people believe what you do not believe yourself. Opinions are prescribed, prepared and administered to the masses like medicine in a giant clinic. It is questionable whether the mental attitude of the masses still deserves the name of an opinion and whether it would not be better described as a simple reflex. Anyhow its inflexibility and perversion will constitute a very serious hindrance to the restoration of a free and living mode of civilization.

It will seem contradictory, if, after having indicated inaccessibility to reason and argument as a dangerous state of modern man, causing excessive and persistent distortions of opinion, we now go on to call our next item on the list of obstacles by the name of shallowness and feebleness of convictions and opinions. The one seems to exclude the other. The fanatical clinging to parties and programmes and catchwords and rallying cries all over the world, the grim consistency in carrying-out tenets of the most inhuman kind, would seem to speak of passionate strength in holding to the opinions once adopted. Two historical instances from the recent past will suffice to show

this expectation to be unfounded. The history of Europe knows two epochs rightly called age of the martyrs, in which men and women willingly died for ideas they believed in, because they represented for them perfect and eternal truth. One is the age of early Christianity, the other that of the splitting of the Latin Church in the sixteenth century. We moderns, whatever vindication the future may have in store again for the Christian faith, mostly prefer to speak of ideologies rather than of confessions. An ideology is a more or less consistent system of some often rather crude and simplistic ideas serving as a spiritual basis in the strife for personal or public welfare and power. Such an ideology is supposed to be held with all the strength of conviction of which the man or the group is capable, even to the point of self-sacrifice and martyrdom. In actual fact the ideologies most fervently adhered to have a very weak persuasive power and are easily surrendered. The world is very forgetful. Only twenty-five years ago it saw one of the mightiest ideologies crashing down in ruins. Socialism had grown and grown ever more imposingly. During more than half a century it had preached universal brotherhood of the workers all over the world. The worker has no country, Marx taught. Proletarians of all countries, unite. Socialists took pride in being scornfully called *Vaterlandslose Gesellen*, and remained decidedly anti-nationalistic to the last, that is to say to August 1, 1914, when Socialism suddenly fell flat and its followers rushed to arms for the different countries at war. It was not the cause that had proved empty, but the ideology.

The second instance of the shallowness of modern ideologies is so fresh in our memory that it is hardly necessary to recall it. Two powerful States and nations stand facing and opposing one another as the champions of two fiercely proclaimed doctrinal systems of policy and economy, two *Weltanschauungen*. One of them especially aspires to world-wide ideals of earthly bliss and perfection. Suddenly the two join hands, forgetting not only the purport of their conflicting ideologies but also the heaps of invective and abuse they had until the last moment been slinging at each other. The one keeps true to its monstrous theory of national domination, the other, hitherto the champion of a universal cause and of a creed of humanity and peace,

shamelessly reveals itself as a conquering power of the most vulgar type. The amazing and ominous thing about this is not the fact that such political reversals happen but that the nations involved suffer the doctrines, for years preached to them as a gospel, and the mutual hate and contempt, artificially infused in to them, suddenly to be forsaken and wiped out. The wholesale renunciations of all that authority had always held up as the highest truth demanding fanatical adherence, must be hard to swallow for individuals of some degree of culture. It is a paradoxical state of affairs. On the one hand these so-called ideologies are inflated with passion and delusion. They would seem to fill the mind to the bursting-point. On the other hand they can be pricked by the simplest practical circumstance of the moment and fall down. Evidently these ideologies are not the sort of thing the early Christian or the Protestant and Catholic martyrs of the sixteenth century died for.

But, it will be asked, do not people die for these ideologies in thousands ? No doubt, but it would be rash to infer that the nations are dying for the several ideologies professed by their leaders. It is their country they are dying for. Here is the awful tragedy of modern war. Leviathan State, having fettered and paralysed civilization, is swallowing up all it can get hold of : the minds, the hearts, the lives of men, no matter what conception of cosmos or society may stand behind the furious combat of the parties.

There is still another grave obstacle which is liable to prevent cultural resurrection, the growing heterogeneity of the cultural ideal and of culture itself within the range of Western civilization. A really uniform Western civilization never existed, and could not exist. Horizontally according to national and geographical lines, and vertically according to classes and groups, our hemisphere has always presented that rich and fine pattern of as many cultural units as there were countries and nations. For many centuries the general type of Western civilization was conditioned by the Christian religion. After its hold on the minds as the dominating factor of social life slackened, there still remained for some time, say from about 1700 to 1850, a common aspiration towards an ideal of universal civilization based on freedom, peace, tolerance, prosperity, humanity and

education. The force which challenged the universalism of liberal ideals was Socialism. It shattered the liberal illusion by proclaiming the victory of the working man's cause the only way to the fulfilment of the promised bliss. But in so doing it not only maintained but even exalted the ideal of a uniform, or at least homogeneous world-civilization. Up to 1914 nobody could suspect that, instead of the day of reckoning coming near, an opposite current would set in, leading to the splitting of the ideal of homogeneous culture itself.

After 1918 the world was supposed to be safe for democracy, except for the danger of bolshevism. Meanwhile hyper-nationalism had begun to spread. It appeared first in a form that appealed to the sound instincts of those pursuing an efficacious policy, *viz.*, Italian fascism, then in that of German national-socialism, deeply tinged with the rancour of the lost war and rendered unsound from the beginning by the age-long inferiority-complex of the German nation. Both these forms soon developed a tendency to hem in national culture within the border-lines of the State. They imposed culture in a special, regularized form, and by coercive measures. They extolled primeval national self-glorification and vainglory and they were able to impose themselves on their peoples only because it was the half-educated masses who were the masters now. One powerful nation after another set up an ideal of a self-sufficient and separate civilization, renouncing and often abusing others who wished to maintain the older values, and virtually isolating themselves from the domain of a world-community. Standards of opinion and conduct, strange, unbelievable and sometimes disgusting to the world at large, became officially approved and prescribed doctrines at the other side of some European frontier. Even the measure of sanity is no longer identical in all countries.

It is clear that the mutual decrying of standpoints, systems and doctrines must lead to a helpless confusion of ethical and rational concepts in the common man's brain. His ethical equipment nowadays is poor enough, as it is. It is all very well to do away with ethics on philosophical grounds. It is easy enough to deny morality as a force or goodness and veracity as universal values. Unfortunately it is not so easy to deny

immorality, lying and fraud because their presence is too manifest. Nobody does, as a matter of fact. Is it not curious that just those sectarians of a moral system based on class interest and nothing else show the largest command of moral indignation and appropriate invective against their enemies? Has the history of religions already taken notice of the following fact?—Repentance is perhaps the most highly spiritual of all Christian virtues. It has always been so strictly linked up with the Christian faith, that the looser Christendom of the newer ages had almost forgotten it. Who rediscovered it? Who invented the new type of public repentance exhibited *ad nauseam* in their big political trials of recent years? *Soviet*-repentance, the newest article in our spiritual treasury!

The case for civilization would seem to stand rather badly. Large parts of the world and numbers of individuals do not yet present signs of the wholesale contagion, which does not mean they are immune from it. Can we detect signs that dispel the alarming visions of impending decay? Is it possible to describe a probable basis for regeneration and restoration of our civilization? We premised before that peace, law and order by themselves will not be enough. Peace, law and order will not work, unless they rest on the basis of a renewed sense of human culture. The most indispensable, though still only preliminary condition for such a renewal will be the restoration of political good faith. It is a platitude to repeat it, yet all the same it remains an all-important truth. No orderly intercourse between states and nations will ever be possible without a certain minimum of reliability universally acknowledged and generally practised. Even the ordinary minimum commonly exhibited in trade would be an enormous gain. Everybody admits that in trade you cannot do without some form of mutual credit. *Credit* has become so worn in our common speech that we hardly ever realize that it states most explicitly one of the highest ethical values of human life. Literally *credit* means: he trusts, he has faith in some other person. It expresses confidence, good faith, *i.e.*, a certain sacrifice, a surrender of your own absolute safety. Thus one of the most primitive forms of commerce, the so-called Silent trade, reposes on a sort of balance between confidence and distrust. Is it not strange that in the political

field there are many who not only reject the necessity of keeping faith, but also firmly believe that politics should be possible and even better without it ?

Diplomacy, the inevitable instrument of politics, is often regarded as a play, and rightly so. We are used to expect from it tricks and devices and secrecies and dissimulations, all common in playing too. Still, we expect one thing more from our partner than skill alone : fair play, which means keeping to the rules. Now fair play again presupposes and includes mutual trust, good faith. If these latter are the essential and indispensable conditions of playing, how much more indispensable even must they be to this painfully bad performance called the life of nations !

So let us return to world-wide international good faith, once for all ! Who begins ?—Here we meet once more with an obstacle of the gravest kind. Mutual confidence between two parties requires first of all a common ground for them to stand upon. Each should be convinced, if not of his reasons for keeping faith, then at least of his duty to do so. Does such a common ground between the states and the nations exist in the present world ? It is doubtful, or more than that. The ultimate ground for a mutual conviction of moral obligation can only reside in the metaphysical order of things. Unfortunately our machines and all that have made us so extremely stupid that most of us are likely to forget how we are linked up with the metaphysical at every step we take, at every thought we form. In face of the metaphysical, even if you should have no other word for it than simply death, all political concerns dwindle into nothingness. A serious and active restoration of Christianity or of another of the universal high forms of religion would be able to create the common ground and to effect the state of mind indispensable to real culture. Anybody may answer for himself, whether such a restoration seems near at hand.

If it is not, where are the regenerative forces to be looked for which may save civilization ? Are there any signs of the acquisitive life loosening its grip on human collectivities or individuals ? Or may we count as a healing factor the impending general reduction of consumption, which Professor Carr sees as an inevitable result of the crisis through which we are

passing ?* However healthy it may prove, it will not be enough as long as it only affects material life. There must be a reduction of cultural output and consumption as well. In my book, *In the Shadow of Tomorrow*, I suggested the urgent need of a certain restriction of culture, a voluntary renunciation by the human mind of all the superfluous, useless, trivial and insipid things that weigh down on present day civilization. Civilization always tends to grow luxurious, and thereby to decay. Ours has certainly become exuberant in nearly every respect. Honour, valour, firmness, resignation and many other good things that we stand in need of, have always been the product of some state of civilization in which sobriety and simplicity reigned throughout, as they did in the best days of Arab, Japanese or Roman culture.

If a civilized world cannot subsist without retrieving some of these values it is difficult to see other resources or promises of recovery but in our will to regain them. Whether we shall succeed will depend on the number of peoples and of persons all over the earth who remain anxious to select their own culture, and wish to keep together in some sort of mental aristocracy, of whatever kind it may be. Probably the greater part of the world is not willing to pass from democracy to demonocracy, bad pun and worse Greek though this may be. Let it be excused, because most truly the choice now seems to lie between pandemonium and pandemium, if this latter substantive may be excused too. It might serve to denote a world-wide society in which all peoples or nations, while keeping their previous individuality and particularity, would be able to live together held by a common bond of mutual and universal obligation, firm enough to preclude war and loose enough to guarantee freedom.

*E. H. Carr, *The Twenty Years' Crisis*, p. 305.

MOTHER BOGGAN

By Margaret Duley

JOEL closed the door of his white-washed house and shambled across the meadow. As he went he plucked a taper of Timothy-hay, jabbing it between his teeth. It was the only way he knew of keeping his mouth shut. He was on his way to board his yellow dory and row out for a talk with Mother Boggan. The setting sun reddened her as a pillar of stone in the water with her face turned towards the horizon. More woman than rock she stood as a sentinel watching the fishermen return with the fruit of the sea. Clothed in her granite cape flowing to the water's edge, her under-skirts were of kelp, swirling like a frill. Mother Boggan's petticoats softened her Spartan figure, but Joel knew her bosom to be warm. After long sunny days he could lay his face against it and tell her about his day. The speckled hen had hatched out the gull's egg he brought from the woods, and the gull-chick was running around with the others unconscious of its difference. Annunciata Costello had sniggered at his offer of marriage, and his goat, Beaumont Hamel, bucked more every time he milked her !

Joel was the richest man in the village in actual cash, his wealth assured in the pension arriving on the second day of every month. Twelve O.H.M.S. envelopes every year, with a cheque of sixty dollars for Joel O'Toole ! And he was little different at forty than he had been at nineteen when they thought he was fit to fight for his country. Except that he was lonely. Unhappiness was too definite a word for his natural state, but misery, a nag of shapeless misery oppressed him when the sun didn't shine and warm Mother Boggan's bosom. Since his mother's death in July, 1914, she was the only person with time for his conversation.

Mother Boggan belonged to Joel. To the rest of the village, " she were a nasty bit of rock to run the skiff up agin ". They

were mainly concerned with getting their boats past herself and Mad Moll crouching in front. Joel hated Mad Moll. Snaky and slimy with sea-weed hair she slobbered all day with the water going over her head. The sea kept Mother Boggan clean. On violent days it leaped towards her face but Joel had never seen it go over her head. In a village where dreams and omens were all of the sea, the water mustn't go over the head. When it did the people walked dumb with foreboding, waiting for the sea to take away.

Joel walked on a road separating the beach and the sea, from an arm of brackish water. The beach was built up with fish-rooms, high stage-heads with boats moored at the foot of ladders. On the stage-heads the fishermen ripped out the backbones of the cod, tossing them down to rot on the beach. There was a smell of offal blended with the clean tang of the sea. The arm penetrating spruce-clad country with its squares of meadow-land and potato-patches, was a glazed surface of black water. In the shade it was deep ebony, turning iridescent where it held a sunset and an upside-down world.

Walking so far Joel turned round to look. Chewing his cud of hay he yearned towards the world under the water. There was the sharp lines of the hills, a green boat keel to keel and his own house with its bright red door joining the other in the meadow. It made him feel richer to see his two homes. Some day he would enter his house through the high polish of the black water. But now Mother Boggan's bosom would be warm with sun-fire. His round eyes goggled towards the sea seeing a bright glow on his granite-mother. Spitting out his cud his jaw sagged in welcoming delight. He sprinted awkwardly over the beach towards his yellow dory.

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Joel's mother had watched over him every day of his life until she died. Then they took her to a place where tablets were white against dark trees. Aimless and feckless, Joel wandered with as much purpose as flotsam floating on the waves. He belonged to no one, and he had belonged all his life. His mother had told him when to get up, when to go to bed, when to blow his nose, when to do his simple chores, and when to sit down and rest by the fire. By some dumb routine of her

nineteen years' direction he went on as she had taught him. But he had no stay : nothing to rest on. His mother was dead. If he met the slightest variation from the usual he didn't know what to do.

When his solitary state had increased his witlessness, somebody told him there was a war on. It didn't mean anything to him. He would have been happy under any flag if his mother was with him to tell him what to do, but one day a man in a neat uniform took him by the arm and told him to come along and fight for his King and country. He laughed for the first time since they had taken his mother up the hill. Somebody had told him what to do ! He went gladly and submitted his body to unusual examination. They found it strong, and as his mother had taught him the difference between his right and left foot, they thought he was bright enough. He was content once more under constant direction, though it was not as kindly ordered as his mother's ways. Simple and stupid, he became the tolerated butt of his platoon. His own villagers thought he was " fair daft " to go off to the war. Several told him, " he was after bein' a fool ", and one had muttered, while heaving the fish up to the stage-head, " let de Kings and t'ings that made de wah, fight the wah." But Joel had given his guffaw of foolish laughter. He didn't know what he was going to fight for, but he was glad to do as he was told. He was sent to a barracks in the City, and across the water to another in Scotland. There he stuck closer than ever to authority : took no leave and spent no money. He was obedient to the letter, but no roystering companion could make him touch a sip of beer, or go where there were women. His mother had told him to stay clean and drink no liquor. When he got to France he was bewildered, but his first day under fire told him he would never be killed. He was doing sentry duty with his mouth sagging and his throat dry, when he heard his mother's voice, " Joel, come here ; Joel, come here." Then more urgently, " Joel, come here." In responsive obedience he had stepped towards the voice and looked back to see a shell bursting where he had stood. Another time he didn't move quickly enough, and a bullet went through his haversack. At Beaumont Hamel where Newfoundlanders fell like ninepins, he couldn't be killed. His mother kept

stepping between him and his falling companions. He could feel her skirts and smell the homespun of her dress. Whenever she walked through, the man next to him was always killed. The battle and carnage didn't bother him. His mother kept calling him to the places that weren't being fired over. He was the only man in France that the war didn't touch in some way, but when the Armistice was signed he went before a board of grim looking men, who found him a bad shell-shock case, and gave him a large disability. It resulted in his wealth. He went back to his house with the red door, and began to court the girls. He remembered enough from his four years' service to call his goat, Beaumont Hamel.

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He was twenty-four when he was demobilized, and he settled back as if he'd never been away. He ambled across the beach, went out in his yellow dory, and looked for someone to talk to. But he was lonely! Everyone was busier than he. In a village where a living was dragged from the sea, where the fish had to be split and dried, and the women worked in houses and gardens from daylight to dark, there was little time for one who didn't have to struggle for his three meals a day. Joel's wealth became well known and its details established by the post-mistress. Prematurely aged mothers with seamed faces and backs humped from toil, told their daughters, " that they could do a sight worse than marry Joel ". But the daughters thought differently. As they reached marriageable age he proposed to them all, but one by one they married others who went to sea for their daily bread, and planted their bit of ground for their turnips and potatoes. There was no other man in the village with ready cash like Joel, but none of the girls could marry him for it. They went the way of their mothers and became prematurely aged. His proposals were accompanied by loud guffaws of laughter, and even a marriage of expediency was repelled by his sagging mouth. Then he began to boast and accompany his proposal with a formula, " I've got a house, a goat and a dory; sixty dollars a month; a meadow and an apple-tree ". He never mentioned the hens, because they varied in number, but the rest of his possessions were always static. His formula became the joke of the village on the rare

occasions when there was time for joking. Girls came to nineteen and twenty, and still more girls, but none of them would ever marry Joel. After each refusal he told it all to Mother Boggan. He began to ease his dory alongside, and talk his heart out to the woman in the granite cape. Mad Moll slobbered behind him, and seemed to remind him of his own sagging mouth. His own mother never came to him unless he was in danger. Only once since his return from France had he heard her voice, and that was during a thunder-storm in the woods. The lightning was playing about the tree-tops when he heard the unmistakable command, "Joel, come here, Joel, come here!" He had run from a place to let a tree fall without crushing him. But although he was safe, he shambled in loneliness, and many times he wished for another war to get in the sanctuary of direction.

Time passed. Season succeeded season. Fugitive summer followed bleak spring. Autumn gave itself with a fierce beauty to winter. Winter took the village and cased it in snow and ice. The sharpness of living touched everyone but Joel, and over it all thundered the angry voice of the sea. It beat against caverned cliffs and ran in foaming rage up the beach. Stageheads were sucked back, fish-rooms disappeared, to be erected again in the spring with unquestioning patience. Nature found man puny, and reminded him of his state. While the rest of the village struggled, watching the sea destroy, Joel almost hibernated. He only left his house with the red door to go and have a talk with Mother Boggan. But many times she stood remote and inaccessible, doubly petrified in a cloak of gleaming ice. Then his mouth sagged further, and he huddled back to his kitchen and piled more spruce on the fire. He found himself forty, with new generations growing up around him. He was now proposing to the daughters of the girls he had known when he came back from the war. Somewhere in the thick spiritual sense of him, he was beginning to get very tired. Misery was a dull insensate thing with thin tentacles of pain. Every now and then he had a flash of sharp unhappiness, but it fell back to formlessness before he could shape it to his mind. He came to the day when he met Annie.

Annie was twenty: a little stout, with brown eyes and creamy skin like the under-belly of a Jersey cow. She came of

respectable people who had kept the breath of life in their bodies by hard work. But her father had met three bad years, and his savings were eaten up. If this summer's fishery failed, the disgrace of the dole, and the dreaded spectre of the relieving-officer lay heavily on their minds. So far the summer had been scant in returns from the sea. There was nothing in the traps, nothing on the trawls, and little to hope from the hook and the line. Starvation or the dole stared them in the face. Their few vegetables could not maintain them.

Joel met Annie on the edge of a reedy lily pond during one of his aimless wanderings inland. It was a day of sharp beauty, clear light and bold outline of distant hills. As he parted the alders and saw the pond his jaw sagged in awe to the incredible beauty. One of his few streaks of intense living pierced the dullness of his brain. The slim reeds waved on the water in long lines of purple and green shading patches of lilies. Their white petals were flung open falling away from golden hearts. Piercingly yellow and waxen white they gleamed like solidified light burning heart shaped leaves. Annie was straining towards a lily just out of reach, and Joel tried to get it for her. He fell in to the knees with loud guffaws of laughter. Clumsily he splashed out and sat down with his legs stuck out to dry in the sun. But Annie was gentle and talked to him without a snigger. Insensibly his guffaws became less frequent and more modulated. He found he could tell her about his world of little things, and she had patience to hear of the gull's egg he had brought from the woods, and put under the speckled hen. The pond, the delicate beauty of the waving reeds, Annie, and the water lilies intensified his loneliness. His eyes grew rounder and he saw Annie wistfully.

" Marry me, Annie ? " he asked without a guffaw. " I got—"

" I know what you've got, Joel. Don't tell me." But she said it without a giggle, or a ' get on with you ' toss of the head.

He stared hopefully at her. " Marry me, A-annie ? " he stuttered.

No fish ! Nothing in the traps or on the trawls ! Her father's face getting thinner and his stomach more shrunken. Her mother working her fingers to the bone, twisting and turning trying to make both ends meet. Already they knew the

deprivation of vital necessities. It was the dole for her people with their simple pride in the independence they wrested from the sea! Joel whom no girl would marry! How impossible was it? Sixty dollars a month, and the amount he must have saved up! It was a fortune! She looked at the lily-pond and then she looked at Joel. His face was clean! His mother had taught him that, but his clothes were a mass of creases and some of his buttons were off. She raised her eyes hastily to his face seeing his sagging mouth and furry teeth! But Joel had never got so far before.

"Marry me, Annie?" he said with grinning hope.

"Joel, I, I—"

Joel felt like a man, he even snatched at her hand. His was clammy and cold with the nails almost bitten down to the moons. The clear health of her flesh recoiled. But her father and mother? If she could shut out the lily-pond with its pure white flowers.

"Marry me, Annie?" panted Joel. He was breathing down her neck, and she could see the awful wetness of his mouth.

"Joel, I-I-I—"

"Giv'us a kiss, Annie?"

She leaped to her feet and Joel stood loutishly up. He made a grab at her and held her arms. "Giv'us a kiss, Annie?"

That would tell. If she could kiss him without dying she could marry him! She closed her eyes on the lily-pond, and the kiss from the sagging mouth smacked from her chin to her nose leaving a wet horror. Her flesh crawled and she flung her people to the dole. Her eyes woke on the lily-pond and she knew the nature of defilement. She ran through the alders.

"Marry me, Annie?" shouted Joel.

"No, no, no!" A remnant of caution made her scream. "I'll tell you to-morrow night by the fish-room." The alders closed round her.

Joel sat back on the bank, and grinned at the lilies. He was going to be married, he was going to be married! Annie would have him, he knew Annie would have him. She hadn't sniggered and she talked to him like his mother. To-night he would tell Mother Boggan, and her bosom would be warm with sun-fire.

The formlessness of his mind blurred to a soft content. He was going to be married !

The setting sun poured a nasturtium red over Mother Boggan, and the grey of her cloak took on a glamourous richness. The sea was so calm that it didn't stir the frills of her petticoats. The edge of the shore held no line of white. All the men in the boats were squidding for bait, and the water was red with their teeming plenty.

Much bait and no fish, thought Annie, as she came down the hill. Some years it was all fish and no bait.

Annie lived on the other side of the arm away from Joel, and as she approached, she could see his house with the red door, and another upside down in the water. It looked a nice house under the water, a house any girl would be glad to live in. But it was like the lilies in the middle of the pond : something out of reach. It was a different house in the meadow with Joel as the reason for living there. She knew now what she was going to do to help her people. She had lain awake all night, and the pale dawn on the sea had brought her light for her darkness.

Joel was looking at Mother Boggan staring from an angle that hid Mad Moll. But even she wasn't slobbering that night, and her head rested quietly on the grey-green sea. In profile Joel's mouth was just as bad, and as he turned from his contemplation of Mother Boggan his eyes seemed so round that they couldn't close. She had the feeling that he slept with them open. He shambled towards her with a foolish grin, and they scrunched over the beach and stood in the shade of the fish-house. Annie stood looking at the back-bones of the cod-fish.

" Goin' to marry me, Annie ? "

She raised her eyes. " No, Joel, I'm sorry." She was the first girl that had ever refused him gently. Joel's mind became sharper with misery.

" Not goin' to marry me, Annie ? " he goggled.

" No, Joel. I'm going to the City in service. I can get a good place and I'll send money home."

" But Annie, I got—"

" I know, Joel."

" Y'couldn't do for me, Annie ? No trouble t'you ; Shockin' lonesome ; Gettin' old. All the money for ye, Annie."

His eyes were a round emptiness of misery. Annie saw him pitifully.

"I'm sorry, Joel. Good-bye."

"Goin', Annie? Giv'us a kiss for good-bye now, Annie?"

"No, no," she said hastily. "Good-bye, Joel, good-bye." Her departing feet made hasty disturbance on the grey stone beach.

Joel stood leaning against the wall of the fish-room. He was still there when the red faded out of the sun leaving the world cold and grey. The sea kept spots of emerald where the water was shallow and opaque green where it deepened. The hills became hard lines against the dimming sky, and the black eyes of the caves peered out at the night. When Joel stirred towards his yellow dory the warmth had been drained from the village. When he reached Mother Boggan, she was grey stone; a hard woman with a cold bosom. He sagged in his boat and looked down at her skirts. Under the water they floated gently with tight sea-weed buds.

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The sharp brilliance of summer changed to rain. The fishermen went to sea in yellow oil-skins and made no change in their work. The gardens had been parched for rain, and now they got it. In the strong excesses of nature it didn't know when to stop. For twelve days and nights it streamed down, and saturated the vegetation to damaging point. Growth came to the verge of mould, and green leaves were alive with snails. There were no intervals of sun. Perseveringly it rained in long straight lines, varying only to a slant when the wind changed. It filled the holes and hollows in the rocks and made puddles to dance on. The large surface of the sea, and the arm of brackish water rippled with the tread of rain, like a wild aquatic dance. Everybody was busy with the effort of keeping the scant catch of fish from mouldering in the fish-rooms. They were piled up head to tail, waiting for a break in the weather.

Joel's world was sodden around him. His fire-wood was always damp, his feet were wet, the goat's hair was dripping, and drops trickled on his hands when he milked her. The grass became soaked, and the tapers of Timothy hay were beaten to a list. Mother Boggan had become a rain-woman, and no sun-

fire warmed her bosom. All day he sat in his kitchen, in his house with the red door, and did nothing but the merest necessities of life. His formless misery changed to a wet wretchedness, but he didn't know what to do about it.

On the twelfth twilight the rain ceased, and if it had been dawning day the sun would have come through. A few gleams of hidden colour streaked in the western sky. The fisherman looked up and knew they could spread out their fish to-morrow.

Joel dragged himself through the meadow. His boots became sopping wet, but he shambled down to the beach. It was a washed world and the sun would have to be strong to drink the surplus moisture. Silently he unmoored his yellow dory and rowed out. The outline of everything was smudged, as if the rain had washed the hard edges away. He rowed between Mother Boggan and Mad Moll, and eased gently alongside of Mother Boggan. He shipped his oars, threw out his anchor and just sat. It grew dusk and he hadn't moved. A gull flew whitely by and his round eyes followed it over Mother Boggan's head. He put out his hand and touched her grey cloak. Then he stood up and laid his face against her granite bosom. It was wet, wet, full of wet wretchedness, and all around him rolled the sea with a long oily swell. There was nothing but wetness everywhere. Miserably he put his arms around his granite Mother, and tried to press himself closer. He stood up on the seat of his dory to reach her granite neck. He put his face against it, and didn't know whether it felt cold, or wet, or both. Mad Moll slobbered a bit behind him : she seemed to be gulping down the rolling sea. He gave a loud laugh. Mad Moll must have a big stomach ; His feet lost the seat of his dory and a screech came out of his mouth. Wildly he kicked with his arms round Mother Boggan's neck until the dory bobbed gently out of reach. He was panting, and his round eyes goggled and protruded. Then he heard his Mother's voice, " Joel, come here ! Joel, come here ! " It came from the hem of Mother Boggan's skirts. Then from further down. " Joel come here ! Joel, come here ! " His mouth changed to a happy grin and his round eyes smiled. The voice came again from below the sea-weed frills of Mother Boggan's skirts. " Joel, come here ! "

INDIA AND HER FUTURE

By Edward Thompson

TO understand how the Indian deadlock arose, we must remember the former criticism of this country's foreign policy, which was common to Indian political leaders, our own Left and some Conservatives and the deepening concern of Indian opinion with India's international status. Ever since December 1927 (when only Manchuria and parts of China were threatened by aggression), in its annual meetings the Indian National Congress stressed with steadily growing stringency 'the right of the Indian people to refuse to participate, in any war 'without their express permission'. China, Abyssinia, Austria, Czechoslovakia, Spain, Albania, a sequence of helpless suffering, struck the popular consciousness. At its Tripuri meeting, March, 1939, almost simultaneously with the Nazi seizure of Prague, Congress passed its annual resolution in terms of particularly drastic frankness.

Meanwhile, we in this country were not unnaturally watching mainly our own affairs, and the little interest given to India at the best of times grew even less. In the summer, Parliament—by an action which passed almost unnoticed by itself, and was taken as one of those automatic precautions before an expected crisis—pulled back into the Viceroy's hands in case of war (by an Amending Act to the Government of India Act) the extensive powers of self-government given to the Indian provincial elected assemblies. Thereby it brought " into prominence the fact of the very subordinate position which the liberties of the Indian people occupy in the counsels of Britain and the ease with which those liberties can be touched and frustrated, while, whenever there is a question of enlarging them, all imaginable difficulties and obstacles are put forward as ground for not taking any forward move "*.

*Mr. Purushottamdas Tandon, Speaker of the United Provinces Assembly.

To make clear how the crisis arose when war was declared, the Congress standpoint (which in this matter of India's international status was held by the overwhelming majority of all parties) must be stated yet further. It is true that by her Constitution, foreign policy (which involves the power of making war or keeping peace) is a reserved subject. The slight to Indian self-respect may by some be styled merely formal. But in international matters the formal is often all-important. Moreover, circumstances exacerbated the grievance. At the Sudeten crisis many in Britain had asked, 'Why should England fight for Czechoslovakia?' which the Premier had called a far-off country of which we know little. Both Czechoslovakia and Poland are considerably farther off from India than from Britain. When war came, England's nearest neighbour, Eire, was allowed to be neutral: South Africa hesitated; Iraq and Egypt (whose levies are for use only inside their own borders) and the Indian Princes were their own spokesmen. Only British India was made a belligerent without the formality of any consultation of either her Central Assembly or her eleven Provincial Assemblies, and was told she must fight, 'not because we choose to fight, but because England wants us to fight'.* The National Congress, which was His Majesty's Government in eight Provinces, appointed a War Emergency Committee, which issued a statement asking what were the British Government's War Aims and how these would be applied in India.

Indignation has been expressed at the impropriety of 'bargaining' during our difficulties. But India too has her difficulties, and her Governments must now subordinate these to ours, and postpone reform schemes; a war with Germany takes precedence of all other activities, and every Empire Cabinet must make itself a War Cabinet. It is a drastic action to tell another country that its sons are required in our cause, and it is no reply (though it was made to me in New Delhi) to say that India has not been asked to provide any casualties. There is no telling how wide a sweep this war may yet take, and in any case the moral question remains. When passions are deeply stirred, the moral question will always brush aside the merely

*The United Provinces' Premier.

legal. In the American Revolution this country had a strong case against the Revolutionaries. But they focussed the quarrel on the statement that Taxation Without Representation Is Tyranny, and the after-judgment of history and of our own consciences has given the case against us. 'India', said a distinguished soldier to me, 'has a strong moral case'. The Congress leaders were so sure of this case, and of Indian approval far outside their own following, that they were prepared to appeal to the whole world on this one question, of the right of one nation to commit another nation to war.

There was no question concering the war's origins. The conscience of India was with us. 'Some Congressmen tell you', said Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru to me, 'that it is not possible to make India enthusiastic on your side. But I know they are wrong. In the last war there was a doubt about your cause, and whenever you had defeats there was rejoicing. But now? You will have defeats, of course, and some may be serious, and there will be the old temptation to feel pleasure. But everyone knows your cause is just'. 'I am convinced', said perhaps the most respected British official in India, 'that we have lost a tremendous opportunity'.

Subsequent events can be summed up briefly. Congress waited while the Viceroy interviewed fifty-two persons, and then (October 19) issued a statement whose two points were: that the British Government authorized him to say that at the end of the war it would be 'very willing to enter into consultations' with the different groups 'with a view to securing their aid and co-operation in framing such modifications' in the Constitution 'as may seem desirable': and that, as a war measure, selected Indians would be called in to help in propagandizing their country. 'A consultative group . . . over which the Governor-General himself will preside . . . would be summoned at his invitation and would have as its object the association of public opinion in India with the conduct of the war and with questions relating to war activities'.

These 'consultative groups' are well known; they are attached to almost everything. It was felt, further, that a Viceroy who had consulted in succession 52 persons had All India as his consultative group, and could summon by telegram

anyone he wished to see. As to the other proposal, the vaguely worded offer of another Round Table Conference, the memory of the former Conference is a matter of humiliation. Looking back, Indians feel that the upshot was an exposure of their weakness before the whole world. They are loth to repeat the experience, with all its backstairs intrigue and the bargaining of this and that British and Indian interest. The Viceroy's statement had few friends. No political document was ever so swiftly and completely discarded. As a first response, the Congress Working Committee or 'Higher Command', meeting in emergency session, pulled out its Ministries, and eight provinces passed back under autocratic rule. Congress presently issued its double demand, that India be declared an Independent Nation and that the new Constitution be drawn up by delegates elected by a Constituent Assembly, based on the widest possible franchise, and that in the making of this Constitution Britain should play no part. The Viceroy, from time to time holding fresh interviews, moved the problem on to the communal basis, and issued statements saying that only the problem of the minorities, and especially the Hindu-Muslim quarrel, held up the swift realization of Dominion Status. To this Congress answered, with some exasperation, that its Ministries did not resign on the communal question and that Dominion Status has become a catchword of yesterday, of no interest in the world of to-day.

Fortunately, the situation cleared, at least to this extent, that it became apparent how widespread was the desire for a settlement, and many in all parties began to be willing to admit that their own party had made mistakes. Many officials conceded privately that they saw the Congress point of view. Congress estranged many Indians sympathetic with it, by demanding an Independence they did not desire and for which they felt India was far from ready. The demand for a Constituent Assembly, too, seemed doctrinaire and unpractical. Finally, the Muslim League, which was in the conflict as a third party, mainly hostile to Congress, overplayed its hand by declarations that democracy was unsuited to India and by a demand that there should be no constitutional advance unless the League first vetted it in all its details.

It is easy to show in India, where the facts are well understood, that the Muslim League has overplayed its hand, and badly. But in this country it is customary to assume a Muslim solidarity and to assume also that Congress is a Hindu organization. 'Seventy million Muslims', we are told continually, 'will never consent to be put under the heel of a Hindu *raj*.' Since in four provinces the Muslims are in a majority, it is clear that here, at any rate, there is a danger of the boot being on the other leg. The matter, however, is more complex than this, and merits some analysis. Congress, whose rolls are for the current year alone and take no account of members who may have lapsed recently and temporarily, claims some four and a half million members on a four-anna annual subscription basis. In this number are several hundred thousand Muslims. The Muslim League is now organized on a two-anna basis, and, though no one seems to know its membership, beyond doubt it is very considerable, and the League is the most powerful of all Muslim organizations. Even so, it has not managed to form a single Muslim Government. In the North-West Frontier Province, where the Hindus form a tiny group, there was a Muslim Congress Government. Sind, another Muslim Province, has a Muslim Government with which Congress is on friendly terms, and the Muslim League is in opposition. In Bengal, originally, the Congress was the largest single group, and as such could have formed the Government on a Coalition basis, with the present Muslim Premier (who was then a Congressman) in the Cabinet. But two and a half years ago Congress was against Coalitions, and refused, whereupon a mainly Muslim Government was formed out of the Praja (peasant) party, the second largest group, and the Muslim League, then the third largest group, with some Hindu assistance. This Government keeps a precarious majority, by the support of the strong European group of 25 Members. The Punjab has another Coalition Government, under a strong and shrewd Premier, Sir Sikander Hyat Khan, and this is the one Province in which Congress is really weak, a fact which (it will later be seen) is the crux of the whole Indian situation.

So much for the four Muslim Provinces. Speaking of India more generally, we must remember that the Muslim League is

itself opposed by well organized smaller Muslim bodies, such as the Ahrars, the Momins, the Jamiat-ul-Ulema, and also by the Shiahs, who claim to be 20 per cent. of India's Muslim population. Nevertheless, the Muslim League is the spearhead of a real and deep-seated Muslim hostility to Hinduism, a hostility which is economic and religious far more than it is political but obtains its present driving force from the League and its energetic President, Mr. Jinnah. By and large, the Muslims in India are the have-nots, the Hindus the haves, and Muslim memory goes back to a time, say some thirty years ago, when the Congress, under such men as Tilak and Lajpat Rai, was what it cannot now be fairly styled, a Hindu body, and often a bigotedly Hindu body. There will never be a 'settlement' of the Hindu Muslim problem, any more than of the similar religious problems of the Balkans and Syria. All that can, and should, happen is a generous convention given by the major community to the Muslims and other minorities, by which for a period of years, until educational and economic disparities have greatly lessened, the latter are granted the protection of representation far in excess of their numbers, in both legislatures and public services.

It is commonly said that Hindu-Muslim relations have never been worse than at present. This is nonsense. There is nothing happening in India at all comparable with the murderous battles of only a few years ago, in Lahore, Cawnpur, Calcutta and many other places. Nevertheless, relations have become exacerbated, and for a rather interesting reason.

When the elections were held, no one was prepared for the overwhelming victory of Congress in the United Provinces, in many ways the key province. There were some rather hurried changes of allegiance, Congress Muslims preferring to fight Muslim seats as members of the Muslim League. When the elections were over and Cabinets were being formed, after much excited argument behind the scenes the Muslim League was refused places in Congress Cabinets. Being refused a share of power, the League went into opposition, and very embittered opposition. This single incident had more to do with the present hostility than anything else that has happened. Hitherto, Congress and the League from the latter's beginnings, 34 years ago, had been rival organizations but not necessarily

hostile ones. They had drawn together in alliance at the time of the Lucknow Pact (1916) and the Khilafat agitation of post-war years, and it had been possible to be members of both bodies and to attend both annual meetings, which for many years were held at the same places and passed largely identical resolutions for submission to the Government.

It is now widely, though far from universally, admitted in Congress circles that the exclusion of the League from a share in power was a mistake. I have argued this with Congress Premiers, and they have stressed the tiny size of the Cabinets. The Central Provinces have only 4 Ministers; the United Provinces, for a population of 50 millions, have 6. Great Britain has a Cabinet of 23, and numerous Under-Secretaries and other Ministers. This absurdity is among the things that must be set right whenever self-government returns; it might have been possible in the days of autocratic rule to govern a country by half-a-dozen officials, but the Minister of to-day has to be present in the Legislature to meet questions and criticisms, has to see constituents, to tour widely and open public buildings, to deal with a spate of correspondence. Ministers have been overworked. But, to return to the refusal to include Muslim League members in Congress Cabinets, I was told, 'You cannot have a strong Cabinet unless it is homogeneous. Coalition Cabinets are always weak, and often wicked. Besides, when we have so few places to offer, why should we squeeze out Muslims who have supported us, to find room for those who abused and opposed us?' Nevertheless, if you reserve seats for minorities in the Legislatures you will never get it out of the minorities' heads that by a necessary corollary they should have the same reserved representation in the Cabinets. Until 'separate electorates' are abolished (by which in reserved seats only Muslims vote for Muslims and Hindus for Hindus) it is not possible for party politics to develop on non-communal lines; the National Congress is the only organization that matters, that has adopted a non-communal basis. India, until separate electorates go, must pass through a period of Coalition Governments. The only way Congress, if it ever takes office again, can draw the sting of opposition is by frankly taking into its Cabinets (which of course must be much larger) its professed

enemies. This has happened in Great Britain, and though no one has much opinion of the results, still the King's Business gets done after a fashion.

* * * * *

I turn to the Congress demands, which are :

1. India to be declared an Independent Nation.
2. A Constitution chosen as the result of a Constituent Assembly.
3. A Declaration of our War Aims.

It is certain that no conceivable British Government could accept the first demand, least of all in the midst of a war. There are generally said to be three reasons against India's Independence : the Minorities, the Princes, and the Problem of Defence.

India's Independence is the official creed of the Muslim League and Congress alike. But the real argument for its impossibility now is the Indian Army, which comes almost entirely from four provinces, and has its strength in the Punjab. The war so far has been a good war for the Punjab which gets the benefit of the military roads and the contracts for fodder and stores, and sepoys' wages. If at any time it should become a serious war for India, then the Punjab will give some cause for thought. Nevertheless, it would be impossible for the British Government to withdraw from India until there has been a radical readjustment of the Army, and a wider range of recruitment. It would be impossible to leave India with one heavily armed Province and so many that are hardly armed at all. ' Independence ' comes to a nation in three ways :

1. Victory in war.
2. The possession of practical Independence for so long that the name also can be taken whenever it is decided to take it, as Canada for example could decide.
3. A practically united demand, such as the Irish Sinn Feiners were able to present when they had suppressed dissidents or (a nobler example) Norway to Sweden, thirty years ago.

None of these ways is as yet open to India, least of all to the Congress, whose creed is non-violence.

As regard the Princes, the present Congress line is to leave them out, leaving any State free to come into federation with British India if it accepts for itself British Indian standards of democratization and allows its representatives to be elected. As

regards the third difficulty, the Minorities, they can be brought into agreement with the Majority, by a Convention framed on the most generous and sweeping lines.

The demand for a Constituent Assembly is largely due to Pandit Nehru, one of the very few hundred-per-cent. democrats in any country. Still more, it is the Appeal to Cæsar, the answer to the charge that Congress ' does not represent India '. It plainly does not represent those who oppose it ; even our own National Government does not represent every single Englishman. But, to those who doubt its authority, by this demand Congress answers, ' Then let us appeal to India as a whole, on the basis of the humblest and poorest as well as the few educated. Call a Constituent Assembly, and from it elect Delegates to frame the new Constitution.'

We can, however, get at the back of the various demands that are coming from India, and find out essentials, desired by all parties. They are three in number :

1. Never again will India allow herself to be declared a belligerent in a far-off war that has resulted from another country's foreign policy.
2. She has what she regards as a ' dictated ' Constitution, and means to have one of her own choice.
3. The war must be made what it is not as yet, a reality to India, by a declaration of our war aims.

This does not mean war aims as some French politicians mean them ; the possible dismemberment of Germany, France taking the left bank of the Rhine, Habsburgs or Hohenzollerns returning. It means some statement that brings an emotional and imaginative people the assurance that they are our comrades in an effort that is going to bring not Europe only, but all the world, more happiness and more justice than ever before.

Finally, while our side, not unnaturally, are thinking of an Indian settlement along the familiar lines, of communal balance and compromise, the Indian leaders are dreaming of a reconstruction far more thorough, on the lines of an essentially peasant civilization. Britain has given India good things, including one of the best of all, unbroken peace over an immense area and tract of time. But that peace has held things static so long that a score of internal problems have overtaken this generation, and clamour for strong treatment.

The Princes are certainly one of these. There are some

580 States of widely varying powers and importance. Close o fifty have an area of one square mile or less; another hundre of 5 miles or less. The revenues and population of very many are ridiculously tiny. The States have become an economi impossibility and a political scandal. Only 21 in all reach a population of 2 millions and/or a revenue exceeding 50 lakh (about £375,000), the standards which the Congress has suggested (and surely not unreasonably) as requisite for recognition as a tolerable administrative unit.

To conclude: it should be possible to meet the essentia demands, while rejecting (as any British Government would) demands that India be declared forthwith an Independent Nation and that the British stand aside at the making of the Constitution. It is now more than 20 years since Dominion Status was promised. A promise that this pledge would be implemented as soon as the war ends, and an assurance that the new Constitution will not be a 'dictated' one, although the Government asserts its right to share in the making and to play a useful part which no other can play, would bring relief and immediate acceptance. Mr. Gandhi, to whom the Congress Working Committee have left the issues of peace and war, intends to have a settlement if he can obtain terms that give him a chance against his own people. Time is no more a neutra in this Indian problem than in the European war; he is steadily whittling away the probabilities of a good-tempered agreement on tolerable terms. There is stirring in India a restlessness o which I find people in this country have no conception. Dominion Status is no magic incantation, that will set every thing on a satisfactory path to the millenium. The next two years in India will be touch and go, and a widespread and desperate attempt at violent change can be averted only i Dominion Status is merely the starting-point for a tremendou work of reconstruction by Britain and India in co-operation, a work economic even more than political, and long overdue Without the political settlement nothing can be done. But th political settlement is merely the first essential.

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STRATEGY BY LAND, SEA AND AIR

I.—THE LAND

By Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn

HAVE Hitler and his advisers yet definitely decided on the course of action they will follow this year? Are they still hesitating whether to risk their fate in a great offensive or to adopt a defensive policy trusting to wear down the determination of the Allies by peace offensives and a war of nerves?

In spite of the threats they have so often uttered there are, I think, clear indications that they fully realize what a desperate gamble offensive action would mean. Goering's speech of February 16, in which he warned the Germans that their powers of endurance would be tested, showed little confidence that a quick victory by offensive action could be hoped for. It may have been a warning that an offensive might result in stalemate or an indication of a decision to stand on the defensive. Personally I read it as an indication of an intention to pursue a defensive policy.

The evident desire of Germany to extricate Russia from the Finnish entanglement and her jubilation at the results of that war also, I think, indicate a hope to establish conditions favourable to a defensive policy. The prospects of obtaining supplies from Russia, and of having her help in maintaining pressure on the Danubian countries, increase in importance the longer war is expected to last. By applying pressure on the Scandinavian countries, whether openly or by implication, to prevent the intervention of the Allies in Finland, Germany has retained the advantage of the passage way through Norwegian territorial waters and her communication with the Swedish Iron and the Finnish Nickel mines:—advantages of greater importance in a prolonged struggle than in a *Blitzkrieg* waged

mainly with accumulated reserves. On the other hand, *Blitzkrieg* offensive had been decided on, it might be argued Germany would have been well pleased to see British French strength dissipated in a war with Russia. In event it is unlikely that Germany would have been comp to send assistance to her partner though she might have opportunities of attacking the sea communications of Allied forces and of using effectively her war vessels confine the Baltic.

But, if Germany has decided on a defensive struggle, ho that the Allies may eventually accept the *fait accompl* Eastern Europe, her chief interest is evidently to keep Ru out of the war, and British war-ships out of the Black Russia, if she were drawn in, not only would need all her products but her oil wells would be in danger. In fact becomes evident that Germany will not commit herself t offensive the Allies might eventually find it advisable to positive action against Russia.

Considering that the strength of the Allies is daily increa the mere fact that Germany has not yet initiated offen operations may also be an indication of her hesitation to the gamble. The season for offensives, judging by the prece of the last war, may be said to open in March. Possibly o to the exceptional character of the weather this year, the se is late in opening.

Hitler, perhaps, has waited to see if the Sumner Wel mission would open prospects of a successful peace offen If he had hopes in that direction they are likely to be das for it is obvious that if anything were needed to stiffen determination of the Allies to see the War brought to a def conclusion the fate of Finland provides it.

We may assume therefore that Germany will be left with alternatives of pursuing a defensive or an offensive policy she has not yet decided on which course to follow her dec must soon be taken. I myself believe that the result o Finnish War will decide Germany to remain on the defen That is to say, that she will neither open a totalitarian offensive nor seek to gain a decision by attempts to b through or to turn the Allies' defences.

Nothing has occurred to encourage a belief that a decision can be obtained by ruthless air warfare. Even in Finland where it could be waged with overwhelming forces and without fear of reprisals it had little influence on the result of the war, except so far as it may have affected the supplies of the Finnish Army. Its moral effect was, as in other cases, to stiffen the will to resist. Nor is there any indication that Germany has abandoned her determination not to expose her people to reprisals. The growing strength of the Allied Air Force affords every reason why she should adhere to that determination.

There seems even less likelihood that the German General Staff will be encouraged by Russian experiences in the Karelian Isthmus to attempt to break through the Maginot Line. Such success, and it was far from complete, that the Russians had was due to the inability of the Finns to find reliefs for exhausted men, and perhaps still more to their lack of reserves with which to counter attack when posts were lost.

The Russian troops showed no lack of courage and some at least were trained to a fairly high standard. They were supported by masses of artillery and innumerable tanks. German troops might have suffered less appalling casualties owing to better training and leadership and would probably have made more effective use of their artillery, but even the best trained Germans are not supermen, and their bodies and their tanks are vulnerable to fire. If they were called on to attack French or British defences they would be met by fresh troops and by a volume of artillery and small arm fire far exceeding that which the Finns could develop. It is possible that artillery technique superior to that of the Russians might lead to minor successes but the Allies would have ample reserves for counter attack. On the whole the Russian experiences serve as a warning rather than an encouragement to leaders ordered to break through highly organized defences and it is obvious that the expenditure of munitions to achieve even partial success would be terrific.

Now that the Dutch, Belgians and Swiss have been given time to improve their defences and to mobilize their armies, an attack on their positions would be a serious undertaking which, even if successful, would almost certainly seriously reduce the strength of the German Army and its ability to meet the full strength

of the allied forces whether in the open or behind their prepare defences. The chief advantage that the Germans might gain b attacking through neutral territory would be that it migh introduce an element of surprise as to the exact points selecte for their main attack; and that should, as might be expecte the Allies move troops to the assistance of the countries attacke their columns might suffer from air attack. Such dang would be no greater, and in fact probably less, than the Germa would encounter when carrying out their initial deploymen for the Allied troops would be moving under the protection previously organized ground defences. We have not, howeve as yet had experience of the effect of air attack on troop mov ment when the opposing air forces are approximately equal an ground defences well organized.

I have so far been arguing against the probability of th Germans seeking a decision either by unrestricted air attack by a *blitzkrieg*. But it has been suggested that they migh attempt to gnaw their way through the Maginot line by delibera siege operations. I hardly think such a course is likely, for th Maginot line constitutes a fortress containing an immense fie army in reserve whose strength would be little affected b siege operations. The besieger on the other hand would hav to expend enormous quantities of his material and would hav to expose his field troops to immense losses in fighting his wa forward, especially as he would be exposed to persistent a attack and to devastating artillery fire.

On the whole though it is rash to prophesy I arrive at th conclusion that if the Germans are not driven to taking offensiv action by economic conditions—and the result of the Finni war seems to make that less probable—they will adopt defensive policy. Does that, however, mean that they will s inactive behind their western wall waiting for the Allies attack them. That would mean fighting on German soil an the loss of the Saarbrucken mines. I should expect them rath to advance against the outpost zone of the Maginot line in endeavour to engage the Allied troops in comparatively op warfare.

It is conceivable that they might with the same object fighting in the open and off German territory, inva

Luxembourg and possibly Belgium and Holland without committing themselves to the attack of heavily fortified positions. A war of even limited manœuvre might appear to offer German troops more scope than purely defensive action which would leave the initiative entirely with the Allies.

Whether the advantages to be gained by violating their neutrality would compensate for the loss of such trade as they still maintain with the Low countries is not easy to say; but we must admit that the co-operation of the Dutch and Belgian armies would not greatly increase the offensive power of the Allies. It would introduce complications of command, administration, armaments and general strategic policy which might be turned to German advantage.

What ever system the Germans might decide to adopt in defensive operations they would, it may be presumed, be associated with intensification of their attacks on Allied shipping. If such attacks included air attacks on seaports the question of what form reprisals would take must arise. The German ports exposed to reprisal attack would neither be of vital importance nor easily approached and they would be well defended. The whole question of reprisals is however one of policy rather than strategy.

What action the Allies will take if the Germans remain on the defensive is hardly a matter for speculation. Obviously however, an indefinite continuance of inactivity would be dangerous, undermining determination with sheer boredom.

II.—THE SEA

By Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond

THE seventh month of the war affords an occasion for a stocktaking of the results at sea. Up to the middle of March Great Britain had lost by sinking about 640,000 tons of shipping out of 21,000,000 tons, or some 3 per cent. of her tonnage. By captures and new construction this percentage is reduced to a little over one per cent. Germany, out of her 4,000,000 tons of shipping had lost 7½ per cent. of her tonnage by capture or her own act of scuttling, and the remaining 92½ per cent. lie idle in her own or neutral ports except a small number making voyages in the Baltic or within neutral Scandinavian waters.

The figures of tonnage lost do not alone give a complete picture of the situation at sea. The object of sea warfare—or rather in that part of it which is directed against enemy commerce—is to deprive the enemy of those supplies which he obtained from overseas. Germany has been deprived of the carrying power of practically the whole of her merchant tonnage. All of it has ceased to pay. The losses which Great Britain has sustained have not stopped the flow of British shipping. There has been an inevitable reduction in the volume, but that reduction is not due itself to the losses. The need of sailing in convoy introduces delays, zig-zagging and diversion of routes make passages slower, and a number of merchant ships have been employed on services other than trading; troops have been carried from Australia, New Zealand and Canada, ships have been transferred to the Navy as auxiliary cruisers, and others engaged in the carriage of stores to fleets and squadrons, armies, garrisons and air forces in oversea parts.

The outstanding point to observe is that the British merchant navy continues adequately to render its services to the country while the German mercantile marine has ceased to operate. But trade is not carried wholly in national bottoms. The neutral ship performs a part of the service for all countries.

Hence the belligerent endeavours to reduce the supplies which the neutral carries to the enemy. The methods employed differ. Great Britain, holding a commanding geographical position and possessing superiority in naval strength, is in a position to intercept all vessels the ultimate destination of whose cargoes may be Germany, to bring them into port and subject them to examination and the processes of law without injury to life or limb of the neutral seaman or danger to his ships. Germany is able to do the same to the restricted degree of the Baltic trade ; elsewhere her powers under international law as hitherto recognized by civilized nations, are confined to blockade, visit and search. Blockade is beyond her powers : and as visiting and searching can only be conducted by ships cruising on the trade routes, which, owing to her weakness at sea she cannot do except in the form of occasional raids, she has asserted that she is permitted by international law to forbid neutrals to conduct any trade with Great Britain, and declared that the responsibility for their ships lies upon themselves when passing through such waters as she chooses to define as approaches to Great Britain or France. She attempts to supplement this high-handed command to the neutral by the use of the submarine, the mine and aircraft. She rejects the necessity for visit and search or even for ascertaining the business upon which a ship is engaged. Grand-Admiral Raeder has said, in honeyed but untruthful words, that neutrals are only in danger if they behave as though they were belligerents by steering zig-zag courses, navigating without lights, joining Allied convoys, or entering Allied waters. The hollowness of this assertion has been only too frequently illustrated in innumerable acts against ships which were neither steering zig-zag courses for, or in the waters of, the Allies. One of the latest and most flagrant of these acts was the bombing of the Italian steamer *Amelia Lauro*, a ship brilliantly illuminated and showing her national colours. As far as British ships are concerned, the Admiral seeks to circumvent the provisions of the submarine convention which forbids attack without warning upon a merchant ship, by claiming that as any British ship sailing the sea may be serving the military aims of the Allies, in one way or another she may properly be regarded as a man-of-war. In other words, any act which tends to prevent shipping

from reaching England, whether directed against British or neutral vessels, is legitimate. The neutral, by the same logic, becomes a British man-of-war.

Thus we know how we stand.

Our experience of these six months enables us to form an estimate of the prospects of eventual German success in this indiscriminate warfare against the Allied sea-communications. The most dangerous period was that preceding the organizing and establishment of the convoy system. Through that danger period the country passed, with losses, certainly, but losses insufficient to cripple the country. It was an effort that could not be maintained for long: it was curtailed by the effectiveness of the convoy defence and the heavy losses sustained by the enemy submarines.

It is proper, in considering the extent of the danger from the various forms of German attack, to note the sources of the British supplies of food, raw materials and manufactures, and the areas through which these goods must pass to reach the country. Roughly speaking some two-thirds come from countries outside Europe and arrive through the Western approaches. In those waters they are—as yet—unaffected by air attack, slightly affected by mining which can be mitigated by the mine sweeping flotillas, and somewhat more by the submarine against which those sailing in convoy run, according to the figures given, to about 1/5th of one per cent. Within the North Sea where the submarine, the mine, and aircraft can be employed with the greatest effect, the normal import of those goods barely exceeds fifteen per cent. Even, therefore, if the new form of "Continental System" should succeed in forcing the Northern neutrals to desist from their commerce with Great Britain the reduction in imports would not be vital. Inasmuch, however, as food-stuffs are an element in this commerce, the replacement of these by home production is important.

Though the injuries done by the submarine and the other instruments have been brought within control we must expect a recrudescence of attacks before long, when the new construction of German submarines comes into service: and we must be prepared to find these attacks supported by surface craft: for the Germans are well aware that the defeat of their submarine

warfare in the last war was due to the fact that it was unsupported. So, according to report, a substantial programme of construction of fast service craft is on the stocks in the German yards to which the answer will be found in our own shipbuilding industry.

The experience, then, of these six months gives every reason for confidence in the ability of the navies of France and Britain to maintain the flow of commerce by sea. But while the Allied Navies have thus shewn themselves capable of defeating the enemy in their own sphere of strategy and tactics, the Allied success at sea does not depend upon the sailors and ships alone. We have only to look back to the last great trial of strength between the land and the sea in the Napoleonic war between 1806 and 1812. Great Britain had then an unchallenged superiority and command at sea, but in spite of this and her ability to conduct her trade she went through an economic crisis of the first magnitude in 1810 owing to the loss of markets for her export trade and the injury done to her credit by the Continental decrees. It cannot be too strongly borne in upon us that while the naval and merchant seamen of the Allied navies are performing their task successfully, their efforts will be in vain unless the civilian in every station of life and in all the branches of commerce and industry, takes his share of the defence by the exercise of economy, by producing food, and by the increase of the export trade.

III.—THE AIR

By Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton

THE presentation of the Air Estimates by Sir Kingsley Wood on March 8, amounted also, as is customary on such occasions, to a report of progress for the first six months of the war. A Minister when thus engaged is making out a case for himself and his Department, and it is only natural, Parliamentary nature being what it is, for the speech to glow with promise and to be diamond-studded with factual proofs of requisite efficiency. He has it all his own way from start to finish, and can readily take cover behind a plea of *salut national* if pressed uncomfortably by a discerning opposition. On this occasion, however, Sir Kingsley dwelt on Easy Street, for although our air power has not been as yet extended it has displayed such numerous samples of its worth that it can surely be taken in the mass as proficient through and through.

In spite of this, however, signs are not wanting that the Air Minister, and his Council, are coming under an increasing fire of criticism, though the causes of complaint are not yet well defined and the batteries about to open remain at present masked. It may happen, of course, that the dissentients will find themselves subdued before being able to bring effective fire to bear. Public opinion, for instance, would at once react to silence adverse criticism if the enemy were severely worsted in an attempt to close our East Coast ports by air attack. Equally, a successful raid by us on a Baltic naval port would have a similar effect. But such problematical events partake of the spectacular and, although the critics would be out of court, the deeper bases of their reasons for alarm would remain untouched. The causes of dissatisfaction are accumulative and have a growing head. There is vague uneasiness at the comparative impunity with which our North Sea shipping is being subjected to air attack. It is disturbing to remain in ignorance of the precise significance of the continual reconnaissance by night over nearly all of Germany. It is being

noted with concern that the casualty roll is mounting, and, in view of repeated assurance that all our aircraft returned safely, it is difficult to ascribe a reason for the swelling total. The shooting down of a British bomber by British fighters is thought to indicate some deficiency in training. Vast purchases of aircraft from the U.S.A. are considered incompatible with the statements, guarded though they may be, on production. The long list of waiting applicants for service in the Air Force would appear, in the opinion of critics to point to congestion at the training centres and a consequent slowing-down in the output of skilled personnel. Finally, it is thought by many that the ordering of service types of aircraft from the U.S.A. is apt to be a rash proceeding, seeing that the acid test of behaviour and performance in active operations can never be applied. So runs the main current of criticism which may at any moment be released with the object of bringing about changes from above. Let us now examine the aspersions from an apologetic standpoint.

Firstly, it should be well appreciated that our air effort is enormous, and that our fixed resolve is at all costs to achieve a mastery. To this aim there appears to be no opposition. It is approved policy and valid criticism can only concern itself with the means and methods that are employed to implement that plan.

The enemy's North Sea tactics are of the tip-and-run variety, the hardest of all to defeat by counter in the air, and when they take place at night it is practically impossible. Aircraft can use clouds as cover just as men can use the inequalities of the ground, and the length of coastal line requiring protection is 700 miles. By day, however, scouting machines equipped with wireless might maintain a surveillance over the middle stretches of the water and thus, perhaps, enable fighters to approach the raiders from a rearward angle instead of in face. The situation in the North Sea is under constant consideration by two specially appointed senior officers from the Air Force and the Navy. In the circumstances it is difficult to see what more can be done at present.

As for the night reconnaissances over Germany many reasons can be adduced for this activity, amounting in the aggregate

to complete justification. There is the value of operational flight. The anti-aircraft defences are tested out and a picture of the system is built up to completion. A moral value exists, lowering to the enemy and heightening to us. The leaflets are an insidious form of propaganda which may have repercussions later. Work in munition centres is impeded while the flights are in progress, and the cessation of broadcasting in places is plain evidence, and a valuable advertisement, of our dominance in German air.

The roll of casualties certainly increases, but the deaths in action, the more revealing form of loss, are not numerous. Many are the result of training accidents, at home and others are accounted for by the ordinary hazards of flight in all sorts of weather by night and day.

The shooting down of the British bomber, although a sad occurrence, is an isolated instance of the kind and highly likely to remain so. It is matter for official inquiry, and the reflection which it casts on the training in recognition of our fighter pilots is sure to be effectually erased. It was an elementary error for which there can be no excuse, and whatever steps are possible will be taken to avoid a repetition.

Concerning the purchase of aircraft in the U.S.A. it is certainly to be hoped that training types will mostly be procured, for it is hardly to be expected that a nation at peace can produce designs as good for active service as one at war. But, on the other hand, we had much leeway to make up, and the Curtiss fighters so well employed by the French Air Force against a large Messerschmidt formation argues a competency in that particular direction. It should also be remembered that the Purchasing Board is composed of experts, French and British, who are little likely to recommend the closure of a deal unless satisfied to the hilt that they are getting exactly what they want, and that nothing better is procurable.

Our aircraft production at home has enormously increased though it is obviously not yet capable of catering for every need. The aim is to reach a crescendo of air power in the shortest possible time so that we can match the enemy in quantity when the war in the air becomes intense. The American market comes in handily to fill the gap, and meanwhile the sources of home and

Dominion production continually expand. Sooner or later we will reach self-sufficiency in this respect, and when that time arrives we will be independent of foreign manufacture, though it will always be useful to renew our training types, and thus relieve our factories of that additional strain, by the method of purchase abroad. The difficulties of production under the pressure of emergency are hard to realize by a layman, even when the new manufacturing facilities and organizations are taken into account. There is the lack of the highest skilled labour and, *per contra*, the large percentage of dilution. Only the highest standard in material and workmanship can give results. Modification in design will always exercise a delaying influence. Standardization can never be fully employed. The production of equivalent spares makes an extra demand on the energy of output. There are various types of engine and aircraft under manufacture at the same time. Finally, the various supplies, material and component parts, must be available as and when required with an effect of synchronization pervading the entire process, and a small lag, here or there, can constitute a serious drag on output. Emergency production in this sense can be likened to a stream which gathers head from innumerable sources, some of them sluggish, some liable to obstruction, and others artificially dammed. But for success the tributary waters must arrive in the main stream not only at a precise moment, but in an exact quantity and filtered, moreover, to the last degree of purity. It can be done, and it will be done, though not by the waving of a wand.

Lastly, heavy criticism has been directed at the manner in which candidates for the Air Force have been relegated for long periods to a waiting list, without occupation and sometimes without the means of livelihood. The truth is that the home establishments, including training units and service squadrons, are congested, and the reason is not far to seek. Casualties have been unexpectedly light and there is no great call as yet for replacements to fill the vacancies so caused. There is no procession through the gradations of a training that turns a young civilian into a skilled airman, and the result is a stagnation in the various establishments and a damming at the top. This may have an unfortunate effect, for the casualties when they do

occur will take toll of the perfectly trained service units, which must necessarily meet the brunt of things, and be replaced by men and officers who have had no experience of active service. Until these newcomers have had time to settle in their seats the units on the French and home fronts must suffer a temporary deterioration. The remedy for this would appear to be a process of rotation whereby a constant interchange takes place between the war-trained personnel and that which has only hitherto flown under peace conditions.

When the critical balloon goes up Sir Kingsley Wood, and his advisers, can meet the storm with a fairly easy conscience. So far he has been uniformly successful in his various ministerial appointments, and it has been acknowledged on all sides that his work at the Air Ministry, since assuming office, has been excellent of its kind. He is the sort of man who gets things done, and that is the type of individual in power whom we cannot do without. There is only one change for the better that might be suggested. It is that Mr. Churchill, who towers head and shoulders above his service contemporaries, be centralized as a Minister of Defence, and so infuse with the forcefulness of his disposition the three Departments on which we must rely for victory.

EBB AND FLOW

By Stephen Gwynn

THIS perplexing war has now run half a year and on the face of things we do not seem much nearer a decision. Both sides in the major combat play a waiting game—except at sea where Germany spares nothing, except such neutrals as might be formidable if provoked; and her play is assisted by the policy of the United States, determined even at great sacrifice to avoid embroilment. Italy also, her nominal ally, is let alone. But the air is not fully, or even considerably, utilized by either side for purposes of attack. According to the press, Field Marshal Goering has been telling President Roosevelt's envoy what he can do to Great Britain if he decides to press a button; and no doubt a mass onslaught by several hundred bombers might on some suitable night make formidable havoc—at a cost, for to judge by what has already happened, the attackers cannot count on any considerable degree of immunity, from the British defence. But there is also a French air force, which continues to give good account of itself; and it must be supposed that the air commands, both in France and Britain—operating, we are told, in close liaison—are well aware of the conditions which would favour such an attack. Messages travel now literally like lightning, and it is probable that if a large proportion of the German air force left its bases for a vast raid, there would be, before the raiders came back—such of them as did come back—German towns and centres of industry already learning what it means to be bombed. That is an experience which so far the German command has thought it prudent not to bring home to the German people; for they do not know, and we do not know, what will be Germany's power of resistance when German soil ceases to be a sanctuary.

A Waiting Game

In other words, it is not yet known whether the German

people are held together by such a determination as the Finns have shown, and as British seamen and fishermen are showing, or by fear. There is no doubt a strong element of fighting enthusiasm ; but is the mass merely acquiescent under a powerfully organized terror ? Hardships and privations are accepted ; but invasion is a thing which the Germans have not been taught to expect ; and it looks as if their high command was reluctant to risk putting their nerve to the test. Yet every week that risk grows bigger ; for unless we are grossly misled, the allied air power with its own accumulating power of production, and with America to draw on, must multiply faster than the German conceivably can do. Mr. Chamberlain and his advisers may entertain the hope that the risk will never be run ; that neither London nor Paris nor their attendant cities will ever have to face that which for these months they have been preparing. Early in the war, an able American commentator reached the conclusion that the allies were attempting an entirely modern form of war which should attain its purpose by the unseen stranglehold of finance and of blockade, avoiding the grossness of wholesale slaughter or destruction.

* * * * *

Scandinavian Policy

Obviously too, if the Scandinavian states altered their policy, the whole shape of the war would change ; but their determination to remain neutral seems so fixed that Germany counts upon it as definitive, and spares them no provocation. The toll taken of their shipping is desperately heavy ; and their fishing fleets, unprotected, begin to leave the sea. The Dutch too are subjected at sea to injuries, which at any other time would have been counted a challenge. And, indeed, they may be so meant ; Holland may be Germany's extended line of attack ; and it may be desired to force the declaration on Holland.

I am not historian enough to know whether any nation at any time in the world's history has planted such lasting seeds of hatred as Germany in these last few years, and still more in these last months. It began with the Jews, but now every Czech and every Pole has good reason to loathe the German name. This policy of extermination and transplantation is certainly not new ; Cromwell tried it in Ireland for instance. Perhaps a million of

Irish were affected; but there are fifteen million Poles. The Irish were not blotted out, the Poles will not be; but the hatred justified by outrageous injustice, has poisoned generation after generation in Ireland and will poison them amongst the Poles and the Czechs—even if so much as can be undone there is undone quickly; and that is a great deal to hope. With the examples of Poland and Czechoslovakia staring them in the face, how should one expect that any of the small neutral nations would face chances of the same? They hate Germany, they hate Russia; but *oderint dum metuant* is a saying much relished by dictators.

* * * * *

Finland

So the end of Finland's resistance has come—imposed by the decision of two neighbour nations to prevent an extension of war into their territories. No other power in Europe has a right to blame them; each has been too late in moving at vital moments in the vast game of power. Finland loses materially more than she would have lost by accepting terms imposed under threat; what Finland has gained in Glory can never be counted. It is for the rest of Europe to see that her loss is limited to what is now imposed. The lowest civilization in Europe—if Russia should be counted as Europe—will replace the highest, at least for a time, in lands that were Finnish. A skilled continental observer has told me that not even the military achievement of the Finns—which in his judgment has no equal—has been more remarkable than their creation within twenty years, of a civilization superior even to that of the Scandinavian states.

Meantime the result is rightly stated as a major victory for the Allied Dictatorships, and a major defeat for the Allied Democracies. Defeats are not final; but at the moment Germany and Russia inspire more fear than France and Great Britain. How that is to be changed remains to be seen; unless it can be changed we are done with freedom in Europe; nor can it be changed unless the smaller powers combine for their own protection. The one hopeful fact has been the action of Belgium when their King ranged himself by the side of the threatened Dutch. Obviously there will be threats to ndependence in the Danubian regions since Germany and

Russia have an interest to co-operate there—if only that Germany may be supplied. But Russia stands to profit by supplying. Russia has paid a heavy price in Finland, yet her military command has acquired more efficiency than the early stages of the war indicated; she comes out with a solid supremacy in the eastern Baltic and to that extent German ascendancy is curtailed. To that extent, perhaps danger to Europe is lessened. But we are living through a dark hour; financial ruin faces every state, great or small, from Switzerland whose mobilization costs £300,000 a day, to Great Britain which is spending £6,500,000 daily—and will spend more.

Still, Great Britain and France are not merely in arms but at war for the freedom of Europe. They might have acquiesced, they did acquiesce too long, in the perpetration of lawless brigandage within the confines of Europe and outside those confines. But they are fighting. Finland fought and has suffered. I should not like to be of those who say that Finland had better have submitted. Let us at least keep our sense of proportion. The world has been enriched by an example beside which other values are insignificant; and seven hundred years from now Finland's sons and Finland's daughters will walk the prouder in Europe, if there be any Europe left in which a man can walk proudly. That is what Finland has left for the rest of us to provide.

* * * * *

National Heroism

We have lived to see an epic of national heroism; and it is not sufficiently realized that Finland's unity did not come easy. Between the Finns of Swedish culture and those for whom the Finnish language was a flag, there was division as deep as between the Anglo-Irish and the stock which counts itself Gaelic. It was my fortune to know two of the writers who have shown the world what Finnish culture meant; and one of them, Professor Yrjo Hirn, author of a remarkable book on *The Origins of Art* was the equivalent of our ardent Gaelic Leaguers. The other, Westermarck, whose books have been translated into a dozen languages, was typical of the Swedish culture; he had little sympathy with the language revival; whether he spoke Finnish, I am not sure, but there were few bounds to his knowledge and none to his curiosity. In

his odd way of life, divided between Helsingfors and Morocco, with the British Museum as a constant half-way house, he moved among all kinds of men—perhaps with a preference for the roving Moorish bands whom unmannerly people called robbers, but who were his friends—and who saw to it that any friend of his should have safe conduct. But whatever his likes were, he had one detestation which linked him to Dr. Hirn; they hated the name of Russia. Hated it and despised it. That hatred and that contempt, are now nourished as never before.

* * * * *

The Hanoverians

Mr. Romney Sedgwick's contribution to the history of the British monarchy is pleasant reading in more ways than one, but chiefly because it will help the British readers to know what they have to be thankful for. The *Letters from George III to Lord Bute** (ranging from 1758 to 1766) show us a fussy pretentious and unintelligent young man, who distrusted all his ministers and interfered with their work as much as he dared. Bute was the exception to this general attitude of suspicion, and Bute's palavering approach to his pupil is less than edifying. But it is Mr. Sedgwick's incisive and amusing introduction which completes our ground for thankfulness. He shows with unsparing touch what a singularly unpleasant stock the Hanoverians came from, and it is amazing to think that out of it were generated in due time the frank unassuming sovereigns under whom Great Britain has faced a very terrible period. Their job has been to help ministers by keeping up the courage of their people, going about among them; and admirably they have done it. But certainly they have been spared the appalling difficulties which beset a monarch when he really was in considerable degree the source of power—challenged always by the rival in his own family to whom the power would one day pass To this rival accordingly court was paid regularly by those persons of importance whom the existing king did not choose to employ. George III, succeeding very young to the throne, was for a long period less hampered than either of his predecessors by this opposition, because there was no possibility of forming a party about a prince who could not expect to succeed for at least a generation. So, government

*Macmillan. 18s.

worked without an opposition, and under these happy conditions it lost America. When one reads these letters, and perceives, what a blunderer was on the seat of power, the wonder is anything was preserved. Yet gradually order evolved ; and it was under George III that the position of a Prime Minister became consolidated. Professor Berriedale Keith in his recent book on the Constitution of England reminds us that the younger Pitt insisted that "there must be an avowed and real Minister possessing the chief weight in the Council". George III's earlier cabinets were put together by the king and they had no unity. That began when the Prime Minister and not the king decided who should be his colleagues. What exactly the king does now, perhaps not even Professor Berriedale Keith could define ; but he is in emergencies a sort of court of reference. And it would surprise me greatly if the present sovereign were not at least as well able as his Prime Minister or any other ministers to gauge what is the mind of his people, among whom he so constantly and so unpretentiously moves.

Finland Fights

H. B. ELLISTON "gives a vivid idea of what this thing has meant to the great little people of Finland," says GEORGE GLASGOW (*Observer*). What is to follow the war? Developments in Northern Europe will call for clear thinking and sound judgment. Elliston's brilliant book gives you a valuable foundation of fact and argument upon which to build. "A triumph in the art of conversation . . . vivid and picturesque . . . he can talk politics shrewdly and with wit."—H. N. BRAILSFORD (*New Statesman*).

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A MOMENT OF LEARNING

By The Very Rev. W. R. Inge, D.D.

ZEUS. A Study in Ancient Religion, by A. B. Cook. Volume 3. *Cambridge University Press.* £8 8*s*.

Professor Cook began his study of Greek religion as far back as 1907; he has now completed a task which does great honour to British scholarship. The concluding volume, in two parts, 1,300 pages, deals with Zeus as 'the god of the Dark Sky, Earthquakes, Clouds, Wind, Dew, Rain, Meteorites.' Next to the author, congratulations are due to the Cambridge University Press, which has borne the heavy expense of these sumptuous volumes, enriched by hundreds of admirable reproductions of Greek works of art, illustrating the letter-press. To review or criticize such a vast monument of learning would be impossible.

The ancestral religion of a nation is largely determined by its racial history. The Greeks were a race of splendid mongrels, a blend of northern invaders of a predominantly Nordic type with a Mediterranean and Alpine stock (the Hellenes were mesocephalic and therefore had an Alpine strain) whom they found in possession of the country. This fusion of the three main elements in the population of Europe had time to settle before there were fresh incursions, and the result was the most perfect type of humanity that has ever existed. Some think that Greek was already spoken as early as 1900 B.C. We do not know what language preceded it; it was probably not Cretan, though the Achaeans found a subject population living under Minoan or Minoanised chiefs, nor Etruscan, though Herodotus and Thucydides both say that the 'Pelasgians' spoke a strange language, and an inscription on Lemnos, a 'Pelasgian' island, has been identified as Etruscan. Greek contains an unusual number of borrowed words, of which the most significant is *thalassa*. The northern invaders seem to have had no word for the sea till they reached Greece. Names of places and rivers ending in *-assos*, *-essos*, *-issos* are pre-Hellenic, and so are the names of some among the Olympians.

These Olympians, Myres says colloquially, are 'a scratch lot'. The Father of gods and men is, of course, the Indo-European god of the sky. He is supreme on Olympus, but his position is not much more secure than that of Odin. He had to dethrone his father Cronos, and to fight the Titans. One of his own sons may conceivably upset him. But he has acquired a bewildering number of attributes, and is the hero of many unedifying stories. One of the most amusing of the illustrations

in this book represents Hephaestus with a double axe breaking Leda's egg, while Leda peeps round behind the door. He is about to repeat the blow when the charming Helen, quite unconcerned, pops out of the egg. Pausanias was shown one of Leda's eggs, and was surprised at its size; it was probably laid by an ostrich. It is a long way from these stories to the rationalist Euripides and his invocation of 'Zeus, or natural law, or the human mind'.

But most of the goddesses belong to the people of the land. Hera was too important to be a daughter of Zeus, so they have to be married. As for Pallas Athene, she probably began as the tutelary deity of the rock of Athens; her name is not Greek.

Aphrodite is regarded by some as a Hellenised form of the Phoenician Astarte; her service of hierodules is suggestive of Oriental influence. In any case she is not a northern goddess.

Of the gods, Dionysus hails from Thrace; some at least of his characteristics would endear him to Vikings. And Apollo, though the origin of his name is quite uncertain, is Nordic to the bone. Rendel Harris suggests quite seriously that he came all the way from the lands where his favourite fruit was called, not *mélon*, but 'apple'!

Hephaestus also belonged to the people of the land. The lame smith of the immortals is a half-comic figure in Homer, but Professor Cook has shown that his worship at Athens was very closely connected with that of Athena. There were stories that he chased the virgin goddess, who had a very narrow escape from him. In remote antiquity they were probably husband and wife.

Two things strike us in studying this strange mythology. One is the extraordinary beauty of the Greek worship. The Greeks could not depict anything really ugly. Even the Gorgon's head, which turned people to stone, is only grotesque, and on some vases beautiful. The great statues of Zeus and Athena at Olympia and Athens were almost certainly of surpassing majesty and grace.

The other is the contrast between the brilliant culture of the Greeks and the childishness of their mythology. But relics of primitive animism have an amazing vitality. Professor Cook shows that in Greece and Macedonia even to-day the country-people observe rain-making and other superstitious rites, handed down from pre-Christian times. The gods and goddesses had very various attributes in different places; nobody seemed to mind. Religion for the Greeks was not a desperately serious matter. It was unwise to invoke the name of a god if you meant to cheat or perjure yourself; but on the whole, in place of the Semitic duty toward God and duty toward my neighbour the Greeks put duty to the State and duty to myself. Paganism is by no means extinct in southern Europe, where we may still study a cheerful, æsthetic, and morally unexacting religion, and the tendency to worship a goddess—the Queen of heaven with the attributes of Isis—as well as or in place of a male deity.

Deeper spiritual needs were supplied by philosophy, which began as natural science, went on as personal ethics, and ended as mysticism, and by the mystery-cults, of which we would gladly know more. How these could be combined with the adoration of a popular deity is shown by the account given by Apuleius of his initiation into

the worship of Isis. The Olympians lent themselves less readily to sacramentalism, though we must not forget Eleusis. The religion of the Greeks and Romans died with their worshippers. But it is deplorable to think that a time came when men could see no beauty in Greek art, so that the choicest works of human genius were wantonly destroyed or allowed to perish. We are not safe even now against these reversions to barbarism. Under the Commonwealth the people of Norwich petitioned Parliament for leave to destroy their 'vast and entirely useless cathedral'; and to-day we see in artistic circles a regression to downright savagery, infantilism, and idiocy which is far worse than the uncouth attempts to represent the human form in early Christianity.

Hellenism, as Isocrates said, is the name of a culture, not of a race, and as such it can never die, for there are natural Pagans, like Keats, and natural Platonists like Wordsworth and Ruskin, in every age. But even in our climate we shall not see any more altars erected to the 'god of the dark sky.'

PHILOSOPHICAL AND LITERARY PIECES, by Samuel Alexander, O.M. Edited, with a memoir, by John Laird. *Macmillan.* 15*s*.

This collection, like the sweepings from a goldsmith's bench at the end of a long day's work, is of rare value. It shows the way a great man's mind worked, and it links his labours as what he would call a *professional* philosopher to his other pleasures in life and literature. Amid the precious débris, however, we find a famous address given in 1932 on the tercentenary of Spinoza's birth. And how well it repays reading again. It is the distilled essence of a lifetime's speculation on the ideas which passed through the lens of Spinoza's genius, carrying the spirit of men from the Ancient World to the Modern World, and enriching it on the way.

Alexander's work enriched it further, as the honours showered on him have shown—if such honours were needed. There have been rumours abroad that some actual blood-relationship existed between Spinoza and Alexander, but the latter made no such claim, and towards the end of his life he stated that "the cult of Spinoza in England was being dangerously overdriven". In 1921, however, he stated in a lecture on *Spinoza and Time* (also included in this volume), that a student of philosophy to-day "may take pride in showing his affiliation to such a philosopher as Spinoza, and the more if he is himself a Jew speaking to Jews: and he may do so I think legitimately by the avowedly unhistorical method of using Spinoza to an end which the historic Spinoza would not have entertained". And he ends the lecture with the words, "I have at most illustrated the commonplace that veneration is not the same thing as idolatry".

These are capital illustrations of the human being dominating the professional. Alexander was as unorthodox in his work as he was in his social habits; a man completely unselfconscious, yet creatively conscious. He always saw his own unorthodoxy and could discuss it with humour. Perhaps that was why he never roused the savagery which is said to exist in such a primitive form amongst the small community of philosophers.

It remains to be seen what place Alexander's work will finally take. It is possible—and I speak as an artist and not as one of his own kind—that he will be valued chiefly for his contribution to æsthetics. Does not that guess, coming from such a source, raise the question whether Alexander will be valued most by the teleologist because of his contribution to the study of first and last things, or by the Hegelian for his contribution to ethics? Does he excel in all that he touches, by reason of his own fundamental quality?

Unconsciously, in his essay on Samuel Johnson, he answers that question while showing how, in spite of a dominating and giant personality, and even a personality which might be called a philosophic one, Johnson could not in the strict sense be called a philosopher. Alexander is suspicious of any claim to universality, and with his genial humours, and his unorthodox procedure, he is a stickler for professional definition.

This volume, however, since it is the fruits of his moments of relaxation, shows best his interest in æsthetics. His preoccupation with beauty, its nature, its expression, its mutations, was constant. He saw it not only as a matter of form and pattern, but as a discipline. He said "Beauty lies not in the choice of the subject but in the use of the material, whatever that material may be, whether words or pigments or stone, so as to render the truth and significance of the subject. That can never be done by successful imitation or more faithful description of the subject. There enters into it always the magic by which the artist transforms his subject; he would otherwise be practising science and not fine art. *But it needs close observation such a science also requires.*

That is a profound saying. It shows how Alexander indentified truth with beauty, giving his whole life to an exegesis of the text propounded by the young Keats in a moment of poetic incandescence. Thus, like all great characters, Alexander was a unifier.

RICHARD CHURCH.

THE CONSTITUTION OF ENGLAND FROM QUEEN VICTORIA TO GEORGE VI., by Professor A. Berriedale Keith. 2 Vols. *Macmillan* 30*s*.

More than once in these columns I have remarked on an apparent change of emphasis in the work of Constitutional historians. The change is both significant and recent. A generation ago all the emphasis was on the Legislative side of the Constitution. Histories of Parliament poured in a swollen stream from the Press. To-day the emphasis has shifted from the Legislative to the Executive and Administrative functions of the State.

Dr. Keith's industry is amazing. To several works which may literally be described as monumental he has now added another containing more than 900 pages, in addition to a Preface of XXXIV pages and other Prefatory matter bringing the total to LV. Throughout this long and erudite work the balance between the several organs of Government is well maintained and Dr. Keith also treats—though more briefly—of the position of the individual citizen, his relation to the State and the Law, as well as of the relations of the State to Religion. It is claimed that the work is written "without adherence to the views of any political party"

The claim may be conceded. None the less Dr. Keith is at no pains to conceal, if he does not obtrude, his own political prepossessions. A critic is constrained to ask whether the expression of them is called for in a Constitutional treatise? For instance. There are in the course of the narrative more than a dozen references to Czechoslovakia the "surrender" or "betrayal" of which evidently caused deep concern to Dr. Keith. He is, of course, fully entitled to his opinions on the matter; but it has required some ingenuity to use that incident to illustrate so many different Constitutional maxims. Thus in connexion with the development which led the Prime Minister to look "to the Electors rather than to the Commons as the basis of his power" Dr. Keith remarks that the Prime Minister can "alone on foreign territory negotiate and conclude a treaty determining the fate of Czechoslovakia with full assurance that his Sovereign and the Commons will homologate (a word to which Dr. Keith shows curious partiality) his action." Whether the emphasis is based on the fact that Mr. Chamberlain was abroad, or that he was acting on his sole responsibility, and without reference to the King and to Parliament, is not quite clear.

Dr. Keith apparently regrets that the Ministry was not reconstituted on a broader basis before the outbreak of war thus adding "weight to British influence in Europe", though he has to acknowledge, in a postscript to his Preface that when Ministerial office was in September of last year offered to leaders of the Labour and Liberal parties it was declined. Not everyone will agree with Dr. Keith that the inclusion of the Ministers of War, Air and the Navy, in the War Cabinet avoids "one of the serious blunders of the War Cabinet of the Great War." On the contrary it is widely held that the War Cabinet should consist of men without heavy departmental responsibilities.

But all this is by the way. It is, indeed, hopeless to attempt in a few paragraphs to review a work of such dimensions as this, a work moreover which despite its many and conspicuous merits offers not a few targets for criticism. This is more obviously the case since, as already indicated, Dr. Keith, alike by his selection of topics and by his treatment of these, gives a wide interpretation to the term "Constitutional". Nor is there any cause for wonder in view of the author's unquestioned mastery of his subject, that he should occasionally be tempted to express his judgments rather pontifically.

On the whole, however, Dr. Keith has richly earned the gratitude of all those who as students, as politicians, or even as ordinary electors, are interested in the recent working of a Constitutional machine unique in the history of the world. The English Constitution has been picturesquely compared by a distinguished French publicist to a "*un chemin qui marche* or to a river whose moving surface glides away at one's feet". To analyse with scientific accuracy the working, at any given moment of a Constitution which is in a state of perpetual flux is a task of exceeding difficulty. Dr. Keith has performed it with rare skill. The work is *bien documentée* and like all Dr. Keith's works, is provided with an exceptionally good index.

J. A. R. Marriott.

THE BRIDGE IN THE JUNGLE, by B. Traven. *Cape.* 8*s.* 3*d.*

THE DEATH SHIP, by B. Traven. *Cape.* 8*s.* 3*d.*

Jonathan Cape makes something of a mystery of the identity of B. Traven whose works are being issued in a new uniform edition, but from these first two samples it is clear that he belongs to that band of American writers who, with all their faults, have blown away the cobwebs of overmuch domesticity from the novel. Mr. Traven has certainly been places and done things, and he brings a tremendous energy and argumentativeness to his narration.

This criticism, if it is a criticism, applies very little to *The Bridge In The Jungle* which, though less obviously powerful than *The Death Ship*, has a unity and compassion only to be found in a work of true art. The story is simple. A wanderer arrives at an Indian settlement in Mexico, and joins another white man, a settler, in watching the preparations and arrivals for a dance. The dance never starts because the musicians do not turn up, but everyone waits for something to happen, and it does happen. Unobserved, a little boy, wearing for the first time in his life heavy American shoes, falls over the bridge and into the river. First of all, his mother, the young wife of the fiddler, becomes increasingly anxious, as he does not answer her calls; gradually her fear infects the others; search parties ride out; divers plunge into the river, and there are amateur attempts at dragging. But nothing is found till a sacred Indian rite is employed, and a candle drifts against the current till it stops at the place where the boy's body rests. Then comes the laying out of the corpse, the assembly of the mourners and neighbours with their gifts, and finally the funeral procession at which a ludicrous touch, which yet in the telling is not ludicrous is the choice of the processional band, of "Yes, We Have No Bananas" for anthem. The whole is a beautifully wrought piece of close observation; Mr. Tranter shirks no unpleasing detail: the rapid decomposition of the little body, the flies, the smells, the drunkenness, and for that very reason its beauty and artistic truth emerge triumphantly. Part of it might be an account of an Irish wake of the old-fashioned kind, but without the thrust of the priest's stick, and with greater dignity.

Yet even here a page or two, a paragraph here and there, in which Mr. Traven is urgent to express his own angry dislike of modern civilization, might well be omitted. This occasional stridency appears less out of place in *The Death Ship* which has already been published in seventeen foreign editions. This vociferous and impressive book starts off with the misadventures of an American sailor who having overstayed his shore leave misses his ship, and with it all his papers of identification. This first part doesn't lack its farcical element as the sailor is escorted over one European frontier after another. The Belgian police consider the Dutch should support this vagrant unrecognized by his own Consul; the Dutch eagerly recommend Germany; and France finally sends him to Sunny Spain, which from his account seems almost a paradise for hoboes.

However he leaves Spain on the Death Ship, a modern pirater, sailing under no flag or any flag, whose cargo

is really ammunition, and is sent down to the stokehold as a fireman's "drag". There follow descriptions of torture and wretchedness written at white hot pitch occasionally flavoured with the simple irony of the tough school of writers. But there are worse boats afloat, it appears, even than death ships; there are boats condemned to be sabotaged by their owners, and at one port of call the writer and his shipmate, Stanislov, who also has no nationality that he can prove, are shanghaied and brought aboard such a one. However, *The Empress of Madagascar* goes to the bottom so slowly that there are several pages of good adventure reading without the happy ending. Adrift on the open sea, no ship answers their calls, and no island swims within their ken.

NORAH HOULT.

HITLER OVER LATIN AMERICA, by N. P. Macdonald. *Jarrolds*. 12*s*. 6*d*.

The average Britisher has little knowledge of and little interest in Latin America. America to him means North America and particularly the United States of America. There are, of course, historical reasons for this. In the Age of Discovery the Spanish and Portuguese overran Central and South America and apportioned it between them, even before the British and the French had settled their claims in North America. Later the growth of the British Empire in other regions presented enormous reservoirs for the flow of emigrants and only a very thin stream went to the lands where a new language had to be learned and the countries were in "foreign" hands.

These historical facts however did not prevent the flow of British capital to these countries in modern times. Mr. Macdonald gives the figure of £1,000,000,000, as the amount of British capital invested in Latin American countries, but his book is concerned not so much with the fate of this capital as with the progress and future of German penetration.

In this regard he has collated a mass of evidence which is worthy of the attention of every student of international affairs. One striking fact is that Germany has not been content to export simply capital to Latin America. She has also exported man power in considerable volume to almost every Latin American state. Long before the coming of the Nazi *régime* in Germany millions of Germans had settled in Latin American countries. There are more than a million people of German stock in Brazil alone.

German penetration was therefore much more than a financial penetration. That the presence of large colonies of Germans in these countries was an important factor in the life of Latin America before Hitler's rise to power is beyond question. But from that time it is quite clear, these German settlers and their families have been harnessed to a centralized plan of imperial expansion.

Mr. Macdonald's book describes the extraordinary policy pursued by the Nazis in capitalizing the results of generations of the German emigration policy. All Germans were brought under the direction and orders of the German State. In almost every Central and South American state the German population became an organized "fifth column" engaged in a colossal plan of economic conquest.

Absentee investors cannot beat rivals who have an organized man power on

the spot. Mr. Macdonald advances abundant evidence of the extent of the Nazi penetration of Brazil, Argentina Bolivia, Peru, etc., at the expense of Britain and the United States.

Mr. Macdonald draws attention to the strategy of the plan as a whole and especially with reference to its threat to the U.S.A. and the Panama Canal. It may be that the Nazis have over-reached themselves by their aggressive methods and that the situation created by the war will give a still greater set back to their designs. The two-way blockade of the Allies is naturally cutting off the Nazi trade with South and Central America. But it is impossible to read *Hitler over Latin America* without being impressed by the evidence of the purposeful and energetic way in which the Germans have set out to fulfil their plans. It should convince any reader that Nazi imperialism has visions of power far beyond the frontiers of Europe.

J. T. MURPHY.

THE POWER AND THE GLORY, by Graham Greene. *Heinemann.* 8*s.* 3*d.*

FOUR WOMEN GROW UP, by Norah Hoult. *Heinemann.* 9*s.*

THE MORNING IS NEAR US, by Susan Glaspell. *Gollancz.* 7*s.* 6*d.*

Under the new scale of prices Mr. Greene is ninepence cheaper than Miss Hoult, though his book is roughly the same length and from the same publisher whereas the rebellious Mr. Gollancz sensibly offers Miss Glaspell, exactly the same length as Mr. Greene, for the old seven-and-sixpence. All this appears to make little sense, but is useful as a commentary on the real value of the goods, for Miss Glaspell would be dear at half-a-crown and Mr. Greene cheap at half-a-guinea.

Mr. Greene's novel is on a higher plane than *Brighton Rock* and what he himself calls his "entertainments", such as *Stamboul Train*. One day he will, I think, write a picaresque novel of considerable quality that will move like a film on paper. Parts of *The Power and the Glory* are picaresque, parts are filmic: shot, cut and projected with the bright eye of a man whose prose is written visually. The book begins as if purposely complicated by a series of cross-shots, and then gradually straightens and smooths out: the story of a brandy-drinking Mexican priest who is being hunted by Communist police and with it, in the background mostly, the story of an American gangster who is also being hunted across the same hot, decadent, terrified countryside. In synopsis, a very bald affair; but the prose has sinews which vitalize the pages with strong movement. The descriptions of the priest travelling at night with the mule, in prison, giving communion to the dying gangster—these and others are made important and memorable by the muscular punch of the prose and the sharpness of the eye behind. It would, however, be wrong to indicate that the book was tough; a feeling of tender, tragic sorrow is implicit whenever the weak, suffering brandy-craving priest is on the page and I think it must be Mr. Greene's intention also to indicate something more than physical values in a story that is told, whenever possible, in physical terms. But even if these values are not read—and it seems to me impossible not to escape at least the implication of a struggle between flesh and spirit, Communism and the Catholic Church—*The Power and the Glory* is a very good novel indeed.

In Miss Hoult the novelist there lies uried a potentially great short-story riter, and I remember a feeling of ismay on first hearing that the author f *Poor Women!* after creating an vernight sensation, was about to become novelist. In *Four Women Grow Up* ou can see the novelist fighting the ort-story writer; the novelist wants manufacture out of the separate aterial of four lives a single, well-rdered story; the short-story writer ould prefer the separate lives, the rtistic restriction of the shorter form. may be wrong, but it seems to me that iss Hoult the novelist has never been eally happy. The prose of *Poor Vomen!* was notable for a plain, onic objectivity; the style of *Four Vomen Grow Up*, in which the lives of our girls are followed from the time hey leave school until they come to heir respective happy, tragic or nfulfilled maturities, is looser, far less elling. Divided into eleven parts, the ovel looks a good deal like eleven hort stories that, for some reason or ther, never got themselves separately ritten.

The Morning is Near Us is just what he doctor ordered. It belongs to that ategory in which the American public, t times the most sentimental in the orld, puts pumpkin pie, rocking chairs, rms in Connecticut, Mr. Chips, and all he other agreeable trinkets on the ational whatnot. It tells the story of ydia Chippman, independent wanderer, ightly eccentric to the point of collect-ng donkeys and Indian children on her orld travels, who returns to the old merican family home to wallow in the ntimental, heart-tugging business of nravelling the Past. When she opens he family chest and begins to read the tters of her mother, telling her that things are not quite what they seem, Miss Glaspell gets full marks for being right with every single prop for the occasion: net fichu, crocheted lace, blue beads, forget-me-not ring, valentines and frosted Christmas cards and the bundle of faded letters. The remainder of the book is roughly in character.

H. E. BATES.

HOW TO GROW FOOD, by Doreen Wallace. *Batsford.* 3*s.* 6*d.*

This book was written for me, the "utter amateur" who has ruthlessly clawed up half his lawn in the grim determination to have vegetables to eat at all costs. Had Miss Wallace published her book a little earlier, I should be blaming her now for the loss of my broad beans, planted in November and my dozen or so spring cabbages. But the winter of 1939-40 was not a normal one and I am willing to believe that in less severe weather the bean and the cabbage pull through. I take heart, moreover, from the information on page 23 that "frost is a wonderful weed-killing, pest-killing and pulverising agent, and should be given a free hand." I certainly gave it a free hand.

In future, however, Miss Wallace will be forced to bear the blame. I have cast aside the formidable text books, and no longer lend my ear on Sunday afternoons to Mr. Middleton. Instead I put my trust in Miss Wallace and follow the fortunes of the B's as they move about their garden in the company of the Weather-Beaten Lady, whose garden sense is very much to the point. The gardening education of the B's being in such good hands it is a pity that their political instruction lags so far behind. Mr. B. is already

contemplating life in the country after the war, a picture of idyllic bliss not far removed from the Dickensian idea of the happy ending, while "the B's nurse-housemaid hangs out the nappies of the infant B". The B's have probably lost the nurse-housemaid already to the nearest munition factory, and such political indications as I find are apt to be misconstrued. Here is an example: "Lloyd George is the best raspberry. Some people like autumn fruiters, but I like a summer fruiter like Lloyd George, which fruits in the autumn on the quiet." How could anyone resist such a book?

It is commonly said about Batsford books that the illustrations are even better than the text. I would not say that this time out of compliment to Miss Wallace, but with the exception of a picture of a potato clamp, the length of a cricket pitch or more, which seems odd in a book about a small garden, they are indeed excellent. A word also about the jolly dust jacket, designed by Mr. Brian Cook. Mr. Cook has designed the dust jacket for several companion volumes on "How to . . ." and in consequence everyone of them shouts loudly to be bought. But one last word to Miss Wallace. I have followed your advice about potatoes. I have reserved no space for them in my garden. I have accepted your statement that there will be no shortage. But should there be a shortage Miss Wallace! Oh! Miss Wallace.

JOHN ARMITAGE.

Jonathan Cape Ltd., are to be congratulated on the publication of The Saint Giles Library of reprints, cloth-bound at 1s. 9d. each.

MISCELLANEA

THE JOURNAL OF JOHN WESLEY, abridged and edited by Nora Ratcliff. *Nelson.* 6*s.*

Many people will feel grateful at this time for the care that Miss Nora Ratcliff has expended on bringing the *Journals* of John Wesley, written between the years 1735 and 1790, down to manageable proportions in a handy volume. No doubt the complete Journals well repay the attention which a few people would be prepared to give them, but to have their essence distilled by the expert hand and to be read in an abridged form is a much better fate for the Journals than they should seldom be read at all. John Wesley was an unusual and possibly an unsympathetic figure, but he had the fire of conviction which too many of us lack and the inspiration of his word reached thousands. "Give me one hundred preachers who fear nothing but sin and desire nothing but God, and I care not a straw whether they be clergymen or laymen, such alone will shake the gates of hell and set up the kingdom of heaven upon earth." So said John Wesley two hundred years ago and if he was on earth now he would find countless reasons for saying so again.

MONTESQUIEU AND ENGLISH POLITICS 1750-1800, by F. T. H. Fletcher. *Arnold.* 12*s.* 6*d.*

Montesquieu is to the majority of the political philosophers of his century as Einstein is to the orthodox physicists. Where they thought in terms of 'natural' law, fundamental rights and a universal reason, he perceived that the primal Reason has in the course of time become overlaid by local and contingent circumstances, so that political pheno-

mena have to be studied in the light of considerations of climate, history, geography, etc., and the basis of sociological study is one of *relations* not rights. Such an empirical approach was bound to be congenial to Englishmen, and therefore we might expect the influence of Montesquieu over here—of *L'Esprit des Lois*, that is to say, to be considerable. Hitherto, however, it has been assumed rather than investigated from the available data. Mr. Fletcher, Senior Lecturer in French in the University of Liverpool, playing the sleuth with a zeal and pertinacity worthy of a better cause, has now tracked down that influence in Adam Smith, Burke, Blackstone, Gibbon (in his early writings) and a host of other minor thinkers. That he makes extravagant claims for the hand of the master was only to be expected—as for instance that he, not Adam Smith, is the father of political economy. But it is all heavily documented, and no doubt there will be a handful of specialists in the eighteenth century who will extract riches from this quarry.

BRITISH BIRDS. *King Penguin.* 1*s.*
A BOOK OF ROSES. *King Penguin.* 1*s.*

The latest enterprise of Penguin Books Ltd., shows once again the splendid originality of mind of these famous publishers. Both volumes are well and cheerfully bound and both contain short descriptive matter and a section of sixteen coloured plates. The text in *British Birds On Lake, River and Stream* is by Miss Phyllis Barclay-Smith and the sixteen plates, beautifully reproduced, are after the originals in *The Birds of Great Britain* by John Gould. A short introduction on John Gould—The Bird Man reminds us that he started life as a gardener's boy in the Royal Gardens at Windsor Castle, and at the age of 36 was elected a Fellow of the Royal Society. Gould's great work was originally produced in seven volumes, and he introduced an innovation in the plates by including illustrations of young birds.

A Book of Roses is written by Mr. J. Ramsbottom and the plates are from the originals in Pierre-Joseph Redouté's book *Les Roses*. Redouté's volume was dedicated to the Empress Josephine, whom he served as floral artist. Part of his work was to give instruction but he devoted the greater portion of a long life to his art.

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OUR CONTRIBUTORS

Peter Drucker: The author of *The End of Economic Man*, a book constantly referred to in recent issues of THE FORTNIGHTLY, Dr. Drucker now lives in the United States. An Austrian he acted at one time as financial editor of the *Frankfurter General Anzeiger* and is well known as an economist and financier.

Professor Denis Saurat: Professor of French Language and Literature at King's College, London and Directeur of the Institut Français du Royaume-Uni, Dr. Saurat commands a high place in the world of letters. His knowledge of the literature of this country is as great as his appreciation of his own and he has every qualification to interpret the French mind to the islanders of Great Britain.

Professor J. H. Jones: During the last war Professor John Harry Jones was at the Ministry of Munitions from 1916-18. Since then he has served on many important economic committees, although his main work has naturally been confined to Leeds University where he has been Professor of Economics and Head of the Commerce Department since 1919.

Dorothy L. Sayers: During recent years Miss Sayers with one or two others has been working hard to encourage men and women to form instructed opinions and to act upon them. Her recent book *Begin Here* was a most able piece of work and if lovers of Lord Peter Wimsey fear that there may come a time when Miss Sayers has no further interest in him, their loss will have its compensations.

Dr. J. Huizinga: Famous as a medievalist, Dr. Huizinga, who is a Dutchman, adds in this issue of THE FORTNIGHTLY to the warning he gave in his book *In the Shadow of To-morrow*, published in England in 1936.

Margaret Duley: Author of *The Eyes of the Gull* and *Cold Pastoral*. Miss Duley is a Newfoundlander. Her story, *Mother Boggan*, has its setting in scenery that Miss Duley knows well.

Edward Thompson: A poet and a novelist Mr. Edward Thompson has a very wide knowledge of India and very strong opinions on this subject. From 1910 to 1922 he was an educational missionary at Bankura College, Bengal and since that time he has visited India on many occasions.

Elizabeth Wiskemann: Since the publication of her great book, *Czechs and Germans*, Miss Wiskemann has had a tremendous reputation to keep up for knowing all that it is possible to know about her subject. Her recent volume *Undeclared War* showed the same expert grasp of her material and her knowledge of the position in Switzerland has just been supplemented by a three months' visit to that country.

Notes on our contributors, Major-General Sir Charles Gwynn, Admiral Sir Herbert Richmond, Air-Commodore L. E. O. Charlton and Mr. Stephen Gwynn appeared in recent issues.